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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that our financial regulatory apparatus is
ill designed to address what is, arguably, the central problem for
financial regulatory policy. That problem is the instability of the
market for money-claims—a generic term used herein to denote fixedprincipal, very short-term borrowings (or “IOUs”), excluding trade
credit.1 The money-claim market is vast, and it is dominated by
financial issuers. Building on prior work,2 this Article contends that
the money-claim market is associated with a basic market failure. It
further suggests that our current regulatory approach, even as
modified by recent and pending reforms, is unlikely to be conducive to
stable conditions in this market.
The Article offers an alternative regulatory framework to
address this market failure. Specifically, it proposes that the issuance
of money-claims be confined to a public-private partnership (“PPP”)
system. Unlike our existing financial stability architecture, the
proposed regulatory design embodies a coherent economic logic.
Furthermore, the proposed regime would be more readily
administrable than our current system, in part because it would rely
on more modest regulatory capacities.
The elements of the proposal can be described succinctly.
Under the PPP regime, the government would:
1. Establish licensing requirements for the issuance of moneyclaims. Logically, this would mean disallowing unlicensed
entities from issuing these instruments, subject to de
minimis exceptions.
2. Require licensed entities to abide by portfolio restrictions
and capital requirements. In effect, adherence to these risk
constraints would be the “eligibility criteria” for the regime.
3. Establish an explicit government commitment to stand
behind the money-claims issued by licensed entities—
making them default-free.
4. Require licensed entities to pay ongoing, risk-based fees to
the government in exchange for this public commitment.
Those who are familiar with the modern regulation of
depository institutions will observe that these are precisely the core
regulatory techniques that have been used for the depository sector
1.
2.
(2011).

The components of this market are described in Part I.A below.
Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 82
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since the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) in 1933. Specifically: (1) the federal government and state
governments issue special charters for the issuance of deposit
instruments, and unlicensed entities are legally prohibited from
issuing these instruments;3 (2) licensed depositories are constrained to
a narrow range of permissible activities and investments and are
subject to capital requirements; (3) the federal government explicitly
stands behind (most) deposit instruments4 through the deposit
insurance system; and (4) depositories pay ongoing, risk-based fees to
the government in return for this explicit commitment. In short, U.S.
depository banks operate under a public-private partnership regime.
Conceptually, then, the PPP proposal is modest, even
conservative. It aims to modernize an approach that has been used in
the United States for many decades, arguably with reasonable success
(albeit with some notable lapses). Importantly, the proposal is not that
deposit insurance be “extended” willy-nilly to any entity that wishes to
issue money-claims. Rather, eligibility would be strictly limited to
those entities that agreed to comply with the regime’s portfolio and
capital standards.5 In particular, licensed entities would be confined to
diversified portfolios of relatively high-quality credit assets. Entities
not abiding by these standards would be ineligible for licenses and
would therefore be prohibited from issuing money-claims in significant
amounts. The aggregate size of the PPP system would be determined
by the monetary authority in accordance with its monetary policy
objectives. There would be no separate depository regime; deposits are
just a variety of money-claim.6 Thus the PPP regime would establish a

3.
This prohibition is a feature of state law. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 131 (McKinney
2010) (“No corporation, domestic or foreign, other than a national bank or a federal reserve bank,
unless expressly authorized by the laws of this state, shall employ any part of its property, or be
in any way interested in any fund which shall be employed for the purpose of receiving deposits .
. . .”).
4.
The federal government insures up to $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for
each account ownership category. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E).
5.
The precise contours of these risk constraints would be determined through a
calibration methodology described in Part IV.B. In brief, portfolio restrictions would be a
function of both the desired supply of money-claims (a question for monetary policy) and the
available categories of credit assets.
6.
Whether money-claims would come to be referred to as “deposits” under the PPP
regime is a question of semantics. Deposit insurance aside, a three-month “time deposit”
(certificate of deposit) is of course functionally indistinguishable from any other three-month
unsecured promissory note. It just happens to be issued by a licensed depository. Likewise, a
demand deposit is an unsecured promissory note of instantaneous maturity (in finance terms, it
contains a continuously exercisable par put option). Such demand notes are particularly well
suited to serve as a medium of exchange. Whether they are called “demand deposits” or “demand
money-claims” is beside the point. Licensed firms under the PPP regime would have the
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unified regulatory approach to money-claim issuance. It would
abandon banking law’s formalistic and anachronistic focus on deposit
instruments. Other money-claims serve a function substantially
similar to that of deposit instruments, and they raise the same basic
policy problem.
The PPP proposal is predicated on the notion that the
instability of money-claim financing is the central challenge for
financial policy and regulation. Credit booms and busts should be
expected to happen from time to time, but it is through the moneyclaim market that a credit adjustment can turn into a destabilizing
crisis.7 Panics by money-claimants are not just epiphenomena; they do
not represent simply symptoms or manifestations of some other
underlying issue. Rather, they have independent effects on the capital
markets and the real economy. That is to say, they do real economic
damage. And they are the overwhelming focus of emergency policy.
During the recent financial crisis, very nearly the entire emergency
policy response was directed at stabilizing the money-claim market.8
Indeed, there is no financial “emergency” to speak of until a panic
erupts in this market.
If this market is unstable, then why not just outlaw moneyclaim issuance altogether? The reason is that money-claim issuance
generates immense economic value. Depository banks and other
money-claim issuers channel economic agents’ pooled cash reserves
into the capital markets. Unlike other financial intermediaries, they
do so without compromising the “moneyness” of those cash reserves.9
This activity is typically (if inelegantly) referred to as “maturity
transformation”—one of the core functions of modern financial
systems. The PPP approach is designed to make this activity safe. It
aims to simultaneously (1) realize the enormous economic value that
arises from having private specialists invest the proceeds of moneyclaim issuance; (2) bring about stable monetary and financial
conditions by publicly underwriting the money supply; and (3)
counteract through risk constraints the incentives for resource
misallocation that arise from pursuing the first two goals.
The PPP approach would make all money-claims sovereign and
default free. In the event of insolvency, licensed issuers would be
exclusive legal privilege of issuing money-claims, including demandable ones that serve as a
transactions medium.
7.
See infra Part I.B (discussing the role of money-claim instability in the recent economic
crisis).
8.
See infra Table 1.1.
9.
For a description of the money-like properties of money-claims, see Ricks, supra note 2,
at 89–97.
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subject to a special resolution regime under which money-claims
would be honored in full and on time, while other providers of
financing would see their claims impaired or extinguished. This
resolution regime would be modeled on the FDIC’s existing resolution
regime for depository banks, under which insured deposit instruments
are seamlessly honored. The proposal does not contemplate coverage
caps, such as the current $250,000 limit on deposit insurance
coverage. All money-claims, whether or not styled as “deposits,” would
be sovereign obligations. In effect, the PPP regime would recognize
money creation as a public good. The system would be no larger than
necessary to fulfill its monetary purpose.
With money-claim issuance confined to the PPP regime,
financial panics should be expected to disappear, as money-claim
defaults would be ruled out by definition. Under these conditions,
entities without licenses might be left relatively free from stabilityoriented risk constraints.10 Unlicensed entities would, however, be
prohibited from issuing money-claims—again, just as entities not
licensed as depository banks are now prohibited from issuing deposit
instruments. In practical terms, unlicensed entities would be required
to “term out” their funding, that is, finance themselves in the debt and
equity capital markets, not the money-claim market. Funded in this
way, these entities would be amenable to ordinary bankruptcy
procedures.11 These unlicensed entities (which would comprise most of
the financial sector) could credibly be denied access to public support
facilities. Importantly, many business models that currently rely
heavily on money-claim funding, such as broker-dealers and certain
types of hedge funds, would not come close to meeting the PPP
regime’s portfolio criteria. Such entities would therefore be precluded
from issuing money-claims; they would be required to term out.
The advantages of the PPP approach would be severalfold. By
establishing money creation as a sovereign obligation, the regime (like
deposit insurance) would remove money-claimants’ incentives to
engage in destabilizing panics. It would depart from our current
regime of implicit public support, which results in public subsidies for
certain segments of the financial industry and distorts market
resource allocation. It would take ad hoc financial rescues off the
10. Of course, regulatory-risk constraints might sometimes be warranted on grounds apart
from promoting financial stability. For instance, they might have consumer-protection benefits
under certain circumstances (e.g., for issuers of retail-mutual-fund shares or retail-insurance
policies). The PPP regime would in no way be inconsistent with such measures. The present
Article focuses only on stability-oriented regulation.
11. The successful 2009 prepackaged bankruptcy of CIT Group—a very large finance
company with only a small amount of short-term funding—is the best example.
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table: money-claim issuers would be resolved under an administrative
resolution regime, while nonissuers (including dealer firms) would be
made safe for bankruptcy. And it would obviate the perceived need for
costly, prophylactic regulatory interventions in the capital and
derivatives markets.
A key virtue of this regime is its relative simplicity. It
represents a surgical approach to a specific market failure, rather
than the scattershot approach of recent policy. In the aftermath of the
Dodd-Frank Act, regulators are now tasked with evaluating all
manner of financial firms, industries, and activities in order to gauge
their supposed “systemic risk”—a nebulous concept that has yet to be
defined, much less operationalized, in anything approaching a
satisfactory way. Even if this concept could be given determinate
content, its estimation would be far beyond our calculative powers. By
contrast, the PPP regime would ask regulators to do what bank
regulators have traditionally done: assess credit portfolio risks, not
“systemic” risks.
This is not to suggest that the PPP regime would make
financial regulation easy or error free. But it would be a mistake to
hold the PPP proposal to too high a standard. If there is indeed a
market failure in this area, then we are already in a world of second
best. Both theory and history offer reasons to doubt the efficiency of a
laissez-faire approach to maturity transformation. And alternative
regulatory interventions—such as broad risk constraints on the
capital and derivative markets, either alone or in combination with
open-ended public support facilities for the financial sector—represent
poorly conceived approaches to the basic problem and entail
substantial social costs of their own. The PPP regime aims to situate
regulatory judgments within a tractable, theoretically grounded
institutional framework, while recognizing that implementation will
inevitably be far from perfect.
I.

THE POLICY PROBLEM

This Part presents the policy problem. Part I.A provides an
overview of the giant market for money-claims. The overview makes
use of a time series data set that was assembled from a wide array of
sources and which the author believes to be unique. Part I.B then
reviews evidence, drawn from the recent financial crisis, that panics in
the money-claim market have independent effects on the capital
markets and the real economy—a proposition that, perhaps
surprisingly, is sometimes disputed.
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Part I.C then argues that the instability of this market should
be understood as a market failure. Transaction costs and enforcement
obstacles prevent money-claimants from entering into a valuemaximizing bargain to avoid damaging runs on money-claim issuers.
The inability to reach such a bargain leaves money-claimants with an
equilibrium selection problem that determines the dynamics of runbehavior. This structural characteristic of the money-claim market
will be shown to raise important questions about the value of “market
discipline” by money-claimants. It will also generate important
implications for regulatory design.
A. The Contemporary Monetary Landscape
Much is gained by our coming to regard demand deposits as virtual equivalents of cash;
but the main point is likely to be lost if we fail to recognize that savings-deposits,
treasury certificates, and even commercial paper are almost as close to demand deposits
as are demand deposits to legal-tender currency.
—Henry C. Simons, University of Chicago, 193412
[P]ure money . . . is nothing else but the most perfect type of security. Bills of short
maturity form the next grade, being not quite perfect money, but still very close
substitutes for it. . . . The rate of interest on these securities is a measure of their
imperfection—of their imperfect ‘moneyness’.
—John Hicks (winner of 1972 Nobel Prize in economics), 193913

1. The U.S. Money-Claim Market
It is useful to begin with a brief overview of the market for U.S.
dollar-denominated money-claims. The following figure depicts the
evolution of this market over the past two decades:

12. RONNIE J. PHILLIPS, THE CHICAGO PLAN & NEW DEAL BANKING REFORM 90 (1995)
(quoting Letter from Henry C. Simons to Irving Fisher (1934)).
13. JOHN HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL: AN INQUIRY INTO SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMIC THEORY 163–68 (2d ed. 1946) (originally published in 1939).
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Figure 1.1: Gross Money-Claims Outstanding14

In this figure, the top nine series in the graph represent
“private” money-claims, in the sense that the issuer (promisor) is a
private firm, not a public institution. The bottom five series represent
“sovereign” money-claims, meaning that the government is either
issuer or guarantor of the instrument.
Each of the instruments shown in the figure above is a fixedprincipal, short-term IOU. Their precise technical features vary in
certain respects. Some, like repurchase agreements (“Primary Dealer
Repo”) and portions of the asset-backed commercial paper market, are
collateralized instruments; the others generally are not. Insured and
uninsured deposits are issued only by licensed depository banks; the
rest are issued by nondepository institutions. Money market mutual
fund (“MMMF”) “shares” function like fixed-principal IOUs and
typically are redeemable more or less on demand; unlike the other
instruments, their issuers are regulated under the federal investment
company laws. Eurodollar deposits are simply U.S. dollardenominated, short-term IOUs issued by financial institutions that
are domiciled outside the United States.15 These formal distinctions
14. The sources of Figure 1.1 are detailed in Appendix A. In certain instances—particularly
Eurodollar deposits—extrapolation was required due to the absence of reliable data.
Extrapolation methodologies are described in the Appendix. This Figure uses a one-year
maturity cutoff, following market convention for the “money market.” However, these
instruments are heavily concentrated at the short end of the range. A large majority mature
inside of one month, and probably a majority mature within one week.
15. The “Euro” prefix is misleading, as the issuer need not be European.
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are matters of detail and are not important for present purposes. All of
these instruments are fixed-principal, short-term IOUs, and they
share basic functional attributes.
The figure above gives rise to a few immediate observations.
First, the market for U.S. dollar-denominated money-claims is huge,
exceeding $20 trillion on a gross basis.16 (By way of comparison, total
outstanding U.S. mortgage debt is around $14 trillion.17) Second, this
market has grown rapidly over the past two decades. The 7.1%
annualized growth rate of this market from 1991 to 2007 significantly
exceeded the 5.4% annualized growth rate of nominal GDP over the
same period.18 Third, while insured deposits were the single largest
individual component of this market throughout the entire period,
their share of the total diminished steadily during the years preceding
the crisis. Finally, while the market for short-term IOUs is commonly
supposed to consist largely of commercial paper issued by nonfinancial
firms to finance their working capital, it is immediately apparent that
this view is mistaken. The figure shows that nonfinancial commercial
paper is only a trivial component of the overall market for moneyclaims. This market is dominated by sovereign and financial issuers,
not commercial or industrial ones.
It is useful to look separately at the private and sovereign
components of the money-claim universe. Private money-claims are
shown in the following figure:

16. It should be emphasized that these are gross numbers: every distinct money-claim
contract is counted. That is to say, these figures do not subtract those money-claims that are held
by issuers of money-claims. For example, the figure includes the “shares” of MMFs, even though
these institutions’ assets consist mostly of other instruments that appear in the figure. A net
figure would exclude MMF shares as double counting. It is worth pointing out, however, that
MMFs are not simply pass-through vehicles. They are engaged in maturity transformation. They
issue demandable IOUs, whereas the weighted-average maturity of their assets may be as high
as sixty days. So their shares are in fact distinct money-claims.
17. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (MBS) FACT SHEET 1
(2011), available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589934849.
18. GDP data can be downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)
database at http://research.stlouisfed.org/.
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Figure 1.2: Gross Money-Claims Outstanding – Private

Sovereign money-claims—that is, money-claims that are either
issued or guaranteed by the federal government—are shown here:
Figure 1.3: Gross Money-Claims Outstanding – Sovereign

As shown above, over the period from 1991 to 2007, private
money-claims grew at an annualized rate of 9.6%, far outstripping the
4.0% growth rate of sovereign money-claims over the same period.
This trend reversed itself in 2008 with the government’s intervention
during the financial crisis. The quantity of sovereign money-claims
increased dramatically from 2007 to 2010. Interestingly, most of this
crisis-related growth came not from the Federal Reserve’s balance
sheet expansion—indeed, the pictures above reveal the relatively
modest size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet in relation to the
overall market for money-claims—but rather from emergency
increases in deposit insurance coverage.19 Still, as shown in Figure
19. This increased coverage was attributable to two policy measures: first, the increase in
the deposit insurance cap from $100,000 to $250,000 under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5241 (2011); and second, the FDIC’s emergency
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1.1, the postcrisis growth in sovereign money-claims was insufficient
to offset the massive contraction in private money-claims over the
same period.
During the years preceding the crisis, private money-claims
came to represent a steadily increasing share of the total. The
following Figure illustrates this trend and its sudden reversal with the
onset of the crisis:
Figure 1.4: Gross Money-Claims Outstanding – Private / Total

As shown above, by 2007 private money-claims had come to
represent 68% of the total, up from 46% at the start of the period. A
cursory examination of this Figure reveals that the periods during
which the share of private money-claims increased most rapidly
roughly coincide with recent financial booms (1996 through 2000, and
2004 through 2007). This shift can be understood as an increasing
privatization of the money supply.
2. Characteristics of Money-Claims
The proposition that the instruments shown in the Figures
above have “money-like” attributes was addressed in detail in
Regulating Money Creation.20 That argument will not be repeated
here. For present purposes, it will be sufficient to postulate that
economic agents find it useful to allocate a portion of their wealth to
liquid instruments whose value relative to currency is extremely

Transaction Account Guarantee program, which temporarily removed the deposit insurance cap
for noninterest-bearing demand deposit obligations, 12 C.F.R § 370.4 (2012).
20. See Ricks, supra note 2, at 89–97.
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stable.21 In order to possess this property, a financial instrument must
exhibit very low credit risk and very low interest rate risk. Moneyclaims are unique in possessing both of these attributes.
In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the term
“money-claim” is not synonymous with the term “safe asset” as used in
the current literature.22 The latter term has come to denote credit
instruments that have, or are perceived to have, negligible credit risk.
Thus a long-term Treasury security, or a long-term AAA-rated
obligation issued by a securitization trust, would constitute a safe
asset under current usage. Importantly, however, such long-term
instruments can and do fluctuate significantly in price due to changes
in market rates of interest.23 This characteristic is incompatible with
the requisite price-stability feature described above. Accordingly, the
term “money-claim” as used herein excludes all long-term
instruments.
Currently, there exists no legal or regulatory category
corresponding to the term “money-claim” as used herein. Instead, our
existing regime singles out the issuers of deposit instruments for
special treatment. The PPP proposal would collapse this legal
distinction, treating all money-claims as a single functional category.
This proposal should not be taken to imply that there are no
important distinctions between deposit instruments and other moneyclaims. On the contrary, two such differences merit special mention.
First, demand deposit instruments serve as the predominant medium
of exchange in modern economies. Generally speaking, other moneyclaim categories do not serve this function. Second, deposit
instruments are a ubiquitous retail product; a significant proportion of
their ownership base consists of relatively unsophisticated consumers.
By contrast, most other money-claims are purely institutional

21. For a discussion that reaches similar conclusions on this score, see Robert E. Lucas, Jr.
& Nancy L. Stokey, Liquidity Crises: Understanding Sources and Limiting Consequences: A
Theoretical Framework 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Economic Policy Paper 11-3, 2011),
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/eppapers/11-3/eppaper11-3_liquidity.pdf.
22. For a recent discussion of the importance of this distinction, see Zoltan Poszar,
Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Banking System 3 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper 11/190, 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/
longres.cfm?sk=25155.0.
23. For illustration: if ten-year market interest rates increase from 5% to 6%, a risk-free
bond with a duration of ten years will lose about 9% of its market value. Interest-rate
movements of this magnitude are not an unusual occurrence. From year-end 1990 to year-end
2010, there were fourteen distinct, nonoverlapping periods over which ten-year Treasury yields
increased by one full percentage point.
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products. In these two important respects, deposit instruments are
indeed special.24
In practice, however, the functional similarities between
deposit instruments and other money-claims are widely
acknowledged. Regulating Money Creation described a variety of legal,
accounting, and economic contexts in which nondeposit money-claims
are treated as functional substitutes for deposit instruments.25 To
provide just one example: they are designated as “cash equivalents”
under generally accepted accounting principles so long as they mature
within three months, and their purchases and sales are not required
to be recorded in the statement of cash flows. In recognition of this
functional similarity, the issuers of nondeposit money-claims have
come to be known in recent years, collectively, as the “shadow banking
system.” Like depository banks, shadow banking firms are engaged in
the business of maturity transformation, but the money-claims they
issue are not formally styled as deposits.
A natural question is whether it is possible to devise a
regulatory definition of “money-claim” that is not susceptible to
avoidance by market participants. While this regulatory arbitrage
problem should not be minimized, it also should not be overstated. Ask
the major public accounting firms for a list of instruments that they
have blessed as “cash equivalents,” and you will capture most of these
instruments. Better still, periodically ask nonfinancial firms in the
S&P 500 for a list of the financial instruments that they own,
excluding strategic equity positions and commodity and interest rate
hedges. The remainder will be mostly cash-parking instruments. As
with most regulatory regimes, there will, of course, be gray areas.26
But lawmakers, regulators, and judges are already called upon to
define and interpret such terms as “security,” “investment company,”
“deposit,” “capital,” “swap,” and myriad other terms that arise under
the financial and securities laws. There are gray areas and arbitrage
opportunities in each of these cases, and definitions must be adjusted
periodically to reflect evolving market conditions. Simply put, this is a
problem that arises under practically every regulatory regime. It is

24. Money market mutual fund shares also have a substantial retail ownership; the
regulatory regime for their issuers is briefly discussed in the Conclusion.
25. Ricks, supra note 2, at 89–97.
26. There will also be an element of arbitrariness in the maturity cutoff. The author would
suggest twelve months, but nine months or eighteen months might be defensible as well. As a
matter of market convention, the term “money market” is used for high-quality IOUs with
original maturities of twelve months or less. Regulating Money Creation reviewed empirical
evidence for the “moneyness” of short-term securities of different maturities. Ricks, supra note 2,
at 94–95.
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not unique to the PPP regime, and there is no reason to think that it
would be especially problematic in this area.27
Finally, it is noteworthy that, during the recent financial crisis,
policymakers largely disregarded the regulatory distinction between
deposit instruments and other types of money-claims. As shown in the
following Table, almost every category of private money-claims was
targeted with emergency stabilization programs in 2008 (compare
with Figure 1.2 above):
Table 1.1: The Policy Response to the Financial Crisis
Private Money-Claim Category

Emergency Policy Measures

Money market mutual fund “shares”

►

MMMF Guarantee (Treasury)
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (Fed)

Uninsured Deposits

►

Transaction Account Guarantee (FDIC)
Term Auction Facility (Fed)
Deposit Insurance Limit Increase (EESA28)

Liquidity-Put Bonds

►

N/A

Eurodollar Deposits

►

Central Bank Liquidity Swaps (Fed)

Financial Commercial Paper
Nonfinancial Commercial Paper

►

Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(FDIC)
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (Fed)

Asset-Backed Commercial Paper

►

ABCP MMMF Liquidity Facility (Fed)

Primary Dealer Repo

►

Primary Dealer Credit Facility (Fed)
Term Securities Lending Facility (Fed)

27. On the contrary, it seems likely that this problem would be less pronounced for the
term “money-claim” than for the other examples listed above. It is in the nature of money-claims
to be simple, short-term IOUs. The introduction of contingencies (as in the derivatives markets)
or longer duration (as in the capital markets) would be inconsistent with the essential stableprice attribute of money-claims. Curiously, the regulatory-arbitrage objection is sometimes
raised as though it were an insuperable obstacle to the effective implementation of the PPP
system. Yet it would be strange to assert that an adequate regulatory definition of “money-claim”
cannot be devised—but an adequate regulatory definition of, say, “capital” can be. Likewise, if
“money-claim” is not capable of being defined satisfactorily, then neither is the concept of “stable
funding” that serves as a cornerstone of the Basel Committee’s new liquidity standards. See
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III:
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING
26 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf (defining “stable funding” to include
“liabilities with effective maturities of one year or greater”). The idea that stable funding can be
defined but short-term funding cannot is self-refuting: stable funding is defined as funding that
is not short-term! The point is that the regulatory-arbitrage argument cannot be applied
selectively.
28. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 136, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
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In addition, the major emergency policy measures that are not
reflected in this table—such as capital infusions under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), as well as the FDIC’s massive debt
guarantee program for longer-term debt—were primarily directed
toward stabilizing diversified financial firms that rely heavily on
money-claim financing. It is no exaggeration to say that practically the
entire emergency policy response to the recent crisis was aimed at
stabilizing the market for private money-claims.
The stated purpose of these interventions was not to protect
these markets for their own sake, but rather to protect the real
economy. These emergency measures were therefore predicated on the
assumption that an unhindered panic in the money-claim market
would do serious economic damage. The basis for this assumption is
discussed next.
B. The Impact of Panics: Some Evidence from the Crisis
Some people just deny that there are real effects of monetary instability, but I think
that’s just a mistake. I don’t think that argument can be sustained.
—Robert Lucas (winner of the 1995 Nobel Prize in economics), 200329
I guess I don’t see a mechanism for money. . . . Once the Fed stopped trying to stabilize
the economy, the economy got a lot more stable. . . . I think the financial crisis has been
greatly overstated as a problem. It’s had virtually no consequences for the real
economy. . . . With benign neglect the economy would have come roaring back quite
quickly.
—Edward Prescott (winner of the 2004 Nobel Prize in economics), 200930

Liquidity events (money-claim panics) are characteristically
triggered by capital-market events (such as major impairments of
longer-term credit assets). This causal sequence often leads to the
inference—implicit in much of the recent policy debate regarding
financial regulatory reform—that adverse capital-market events,
rather than liquidity events, should be viewed as the fundamental
policy problem.
This inference merits scrutiny. Consider a simple analogy. A
powerful storm triggers a landslide that destroys a village.31 Should

29.

Robert E. Lucas Jr., My Keynesian Education, in THE IS-LM MODEL: ITS RISE, FALL,
(Michael de Vroey & Kevin D. Hoover eds., 2004).
30. On the Economy, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://media.bloomberg.com
/bb/avfile/Economics/On_Economy/vv9VRoc8DQl8.mp3.
31. This analogy is inspired by a passage in Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s A
Monetary History of the United States. In their discussion of “a liquidity crisis in a unit fractional
reserve banking system,” they write: “Because no great strength would be required to hold back
the rock that starts a landslide, it does not follow that the landslide will not be of major
AND STRANGE PERSISTENCE 12 , 23
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storms or landslides be the object of future preventive policy? The
initial trigger in this case was the storm. But unless an effective and
affordable technology exists for storm prevention—one that does not
generate unacceptable side effects—this is not a promising area for
policy intervention. On the other hand, perhaps engineers can reliably
stabilize hillsides in a reasonably cost-effective manner.
The seemingly obvious point is that the optimal locus of policy
intervention cannot be determined by simply tracing a causal
sequence backward in time in search of an ultimate cause. This Article
views the direction of recent regulatory reform initiatives as the rough
equivalent of misguided “storm-prevention” efforts. It suggests that
these efforts are likely to prove both costly and ineffectual. The
proposal is that we undertake a targeted intervention to stabilize
hillsides instead—a feasible engineering task that has been performed
fairly successfully in the past, with deposit insurance. Undeniably,
this approach has significant costs of its own. But hillside stabilization
is nevertheless likely to be the welfare-maximizing intervention: it is
superior to storm prevention, as well as to the laissez-faire
alternative.
This analogy clarifies the importance of isolating the
independent effects of money-claim instability. (If landslides do no
damage, there is no point in stabilizing hillsides.) In this regard, it is
worthwhile to review evidence from the recent crisis that money-claim
instability played an independent causal role in 2007 and 2008 in
relation to the credit crunch (i.e., the drastic reduction in the issuance
of new consumer and business credit) and the ensuing economic
downturn.
It is instructive to start from the beginning, with the credit
boom in the years leading up to the crisis and the subsequent bust
that began in 2007:

proportions.” MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867–1960, at 419 (1963).
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Figure 1.5: The Credit Boom and Bust
A) U.S. Real Estate Prices32

C) Real Estate Lending–Serious Delinquency Rates35

B) U.S. Corporate Leveraged Buyout (LBO) Valuations33
(multiples of cash flow (EBITDA))34

D) Price of “AAA” Residential Subprime Structured Credit36
(Jan. 2007 = 100)

32. Residential series is S&P/Case-Shiller composite 20-city home price index (not
seasonally adjusted), available for download at http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/main
/en/us; commercial series is Moody’s/REAL CPPI index (national index, all property types),
available for download at http://web.mit.edu/cre/research/credl/rca.html.
33. Both series are from Standard & Poor’s, Leveraged Commentary & Data (subscription
required).
34. The multiples are based on the valuation and debt levels at closing for U.S. corporate
leveraged buyouts. EBITDA is a proxy for cash flow, and stands for “earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization.” The “Deal Multiple” calculation is: (Total Enterprise
Value / EBITDA); the “Leverage Multiple” calculation is: (Total Post-Closing Debt / EBITDA).
35. Subprime residential and prime residential series are from Bloomberg Professional
(subscription required). Subprime residential is the sum of “90 days past due” (DLQTSP90
Index) and “foreclosures” (DLQTSPFC Index). Prime residential is the sum of “90 days past due”
(DQS1US Index) and “foreclosures” (DQFQUS Index).
Construction and Development and Commercial Real Estate (Non-Residential) series
are from the FDIC’s Quarterly Loan Portfolio Performance Indicators, All FDIC-Insured
Institutions, available for download at www2.fdic.gov/qbp/timeseries/LoanPerformance.xls. The
relevant series are “Construction and Development Loans—Noncurrent Rate” and “Real Estate
Loans Secured by Nonfarm Nonresidential Properties—Noncurrent Rate.”
36. Markit ABX.HE Index (series ABX.AAA 2007-1), provided by J.P. Morgan ABS Weekly
Spreads Datasheet (on file with author).
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The precrisis period witnessed a remarkable escalation in the
prices of leveraged asset classes. This escalation went hand-in-hand
with the increasing availability of credit during those years. The story
has become familiar: rising asset prices provided the basis for greater
leverage, which in turn fueled asset prices, and so on in what
appeared to be a self-reinforcing dynamic. This effect was most
prominent in residential real estate. However, as shown in panels A
and B above, the phenomenon was far broader in scope. It
encompassed other leveraged asset classes, such as commercial real
estate and cash-flow rich business enterprises.37
While subprime residential lending was not the only asset class
to experience the boom and bust, it was the most dramatic. The
fraction of subprime loans in “serious delinquency” status would soar
to 30% by 2010. (As shown in panel C above, serious delinquencies in
construction and development lending—the “subprime” of commercial
real estate—followed a similar pattern.) It was the sudden decline in
the prices of AAA-rated, subprime-backed securities during the
summer of 2007 (panel D above) that signaled the arrival of the first
stage of the financial crisis.
The price correction in AAA subprime credit was the initial
event of the crisis, but the central focus of concern immediately shifted
to the money-claim market:

37. Incidentally, this data tends to cast doubt on the hypothesis that the credit boom was
attributable primarily to affordable housing policies. Such policies may well have been a
contributing factor, but the underlying phenomenon seems to have been too broad to be
explained by affordable housing policies alone.
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Figure 1.6: The Initial Liquidity Events
A) U.S. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding38

B) Short-Term Funding Spreads39
(three-month obligations; spread to risk-free rate)

C) Short-Term Repo Outstanding40
(broker-dealer “tri-party” repo)

D) Assets of Illustrative U.S. Dealer Firms41
(combined assets of Goldman and Morgan Stanley)

Developments in AAA subprime prompted a market-wide run
in August 2007 on asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”), a class of
short-term IOUs issued by special-purpose entities that invest in
longer-term securities, including structured consumer credit. During
the second half of 2007, the volume of outstanding ABCP went into
free fall (panel A) as many investors declined to roll over their
positions. Simultaneously, short-term funding spreads widened
dramatically42 (panel B) as cash parkers sought the safe haven of
sovereign money-claims in lieu of ABCP and other private moneyclaims.43

38. Statistics, SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, http://www.sifma.org/research/
statistics.aspx/ (last updated Aug. 21, 2012) (excel file titled “US ABCP Outstanding”).
39. Bloomberg Professional (subscription required).
40. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 57 Chart 5.1.17 (2012) (excel
data files available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/annual-report.aspx).
41. Data from SNL Financial (subscription required) and company filings. Panel D treats
all owned repurchase agreements as “cash assets.”
42. Widening spreads indicate higher borrowing costs relative to the risk-free rate.
43. This shift is evident in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 above, which depict the growth in sovereign
money-claims and contraction in private money-claims after 2007.
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Panel C above shows a similar phenomenon occurring a few
months later, in a different segment of the money-claim market. The
proximate cause of the Bear Stearns failure was a run on the firm’s
overnight financing through the giant repurchase agreement (“repo”)
market. Despite the Federal Reserve-assisted rescue of Bear Stearns
in March 2008 and the simultaneous establishment of special lending
facilities to support the repo market, the period after Bear’s failure
saw a rapid reduction in repo volumes.
How might liquidity events such as these be expected to affect
the supply of new credit to real borrowers? Regulating Money Creation
described the distinctive function of maturity transformation as the
technology through which economic agents can deploy their cash
reserves into the capital markets without compromising the
“moneyness” of those cash reserves.44 The effect of this technology was
illustrated as an increase in the supply of financing. A money-claim
panic should be expected to cause this process to work in reverse.
Under panic conditions, cash parkers withdraw funds from suspect
issuers and seek safety in sovereign money-claims (such as Treasury
bills) or in money-claims issued by firms with substantial cash
balances. As a precautionary response, money-claim issuers naturally
reduce their exposures to the capital markets and seek to increase
their cash reserves in order to avoid being driven into default by
money-claim redemptions. The result is a negative shock to the supply
of financing. Such a supply shock should be expected to increase credit
costs and decrease the quantity of new credit formation.45 If accurate,
this account provides an intuitive mechanism through which liquidity
crises might independently affect the capital markets and real
economic performance.
Panel D above appears to illustrate such a phenomenon. It
shows the combined balance sheets of the two large, repo-funded
dealer firms that survived the crisis as independent companies (and
hence for which public data is readily available). In the aftermath of
the Bear Stearns run, these two firms dramatically reduced their
44. See Ricks, supra note 2, at 97–103.
45. For a related but somewhat different account, see Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as
Financial-Stability Regulation 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16883,
2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16883. Stein emphasizes the role of “fire sale”
externalities that result from bank runs. Id. at 2. In his model, funds removed from the banking
system during a run are not immediately reintermediated. Id. at 13. As a result, there is less
capital “left over for investment in new projects,” and the “hurdle rate for new investment”
increases. Id. The model is one of a supply shock in the credit markets brought about by runbehavior. See also Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit
Freeze 1–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14925, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14925.
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holdings of noncash assets while parking an increasing fraction of
their assets in cash and near-cash. Remarkably, these two firms alone
reduced their capital market exposures by more than $600 billion.
Anecdotally, other maturity-transformation firms took similar
precautionary steps during this timeframe. This shift is consistent
with a reversal of the process of maturity transformation, leading to a
reduction in the supply of funds in the capital markets. Further
evidence for this “credit crunch” phenomenon appears in the following
Figure:
Figure 1.7: The Credit Crunch
Issuance46

A) U.S. Securitization
(excludes agency securitization)

B) New Corporate Lending47
(U.S. syndicated loan market)

C) U.S. “A”-Rated Corporate Bond Spreads48
(spread to risk-free rate)

D) CDS-Bond Basis–High Grade Corporate49
(credit default swap rates less bond spreads)

These Figures show dramatic reductions in securitization
volumes (panel A) and newly originated loans to big corporations
(panel B). Notably, these reductions began well before the crisis
reached its apex after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
46. See SEC. INDUSTRY & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, supra note 38 (excel files titled “US
Mortgage-Related Issuance and Outstanding” and “U.S. ABS Issuance and Outstanding”).
47. Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of
2008, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 323 (2009).
48. BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate A Option-Adjusted Spread, Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (“BAMLC0A3CA” data series).
49. The author thanks Mark Mitchell and Todd Pulvino for sharing this data; their analysis
of the CDS-bond basis is discussed briefly below. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, these volume reductions coincided with significant
increases in the cost of credit. This effect appears in panel C above,
which shows the increased spread on bonds issued by “A”-rated
companies.50 A similar phenomenon was evident in virtually every
area of the consumer and business credit markets.51
To summarize, the data in Figures 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 show an
initial credit event (impairment of existing credit assets, exemplified
by AAA subprime securities), followed by a liquidity event (moneyclaim panic), followed in turn by a credit crunch (collapse in new
issuance volumes in the real credit markets). The suggestion here is
that this sequence should be interpreted as a causal chain—in
particular, that the liquidity event bore primary responsibility for the
ensuing credit crunch.
However, there is at least one other plausible interpretation
that must be considered. Perhaps all of these phenomena simply
reflected a broad repricing of risk in the capital markets. This view
might treat the liquidity event as epiphenomenal, a superficial
symptom of the fundamental repricing of credit. Under this view, the
credit crunch would have happened anyway, even without the
liquidity crisis. To extend our metaphor: this view would suggest that
the village was damaged by the storm itself, not the landslide.
There are at least two reasons to doubt the validity of this
alternate interpretation. The first comes from a recent study by
Victoria Ivashina and David Scharfstein of Harvard Business School.52
Their paper examines U.S. financial firms’ syndicated lending to the
corporate sector during 2007 and 2008.53 The authors show that
lenders with higher amounts of (uninsured) nondeposit financing
reduced their syndicated lending activities in the second half of 2008
to a far greater extent than did those with more stable deposit funding
(much of which is FDIC-insured). Specifically, a lender with a
deposits-to-assets ratio one standard deviation below the mean
reduced its loan originations by 49% during late 2008 versus the prior
year, whereas a lender whose ratio was one standard deviation above
the mean reduced originations by only 21%. Put simply, financial
50. The term “spread” as used herein refers to the market yield less the comparable riskfree rate.
51. This broad increase in credit spreads seems to rule out the hypothesis that the decline
in issuance volumes was driven mostly by a decline in demand for financing. A reduction in
demand for financing would tend to drive spreads down, not up. The evidence is consistent with
a supply shock.
52. Ivashina & Scharfstein, supra note 47, at 319.
53. Id. at 319–20. A syndicated loan is a large corporate loan provided by multiple
financing sources. The authors focus on this market due to the availability of a robust data set of
new originations.
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firms that were more reliant on run-prone money-claims cut back on
new corporate loan issuance much more severely. The authors
conclude that their findings are “consistent with a decline in the
supply of funding as a result of the bank run.”54 They further note that
“the drop in supply puts upward pressure on interest rate spreads,
and leads to a greater fall in lending than one might see in a typical
recession.”55
There is a second, more direct piece of evidence that the
liquidity crisis itself reduced the supply of financing. That evidence,
the “CDS-bond basis,” appears in panel D of Figure 1.7 above. This
Figure requires some explanation. The credit default swap (“CDS”)
market is a derivative market in which investors make side bets on
corporate and other credits. Essentially, when two parties enter into a
CDS contract with respect to a debtor and that debtor subsequently
defaults, one party to the CDS contract (the “protection seller”) pays
the other party (the “protection buyer”) an amount equal to the
difference between the principal amount and the market price of the
debtor’s bonds. The debtor itself is not a party to this contract.
Under normal conditions, the CDS rate associated with an
issuer should very closely track the actual spread observed on the
issuer’s bonds. This is because even a tiny divergence between the
CDS rate and the bond spread creates an arbitrage opportunity for
investors.56 Consequently, under efficient market conditions, the
difference between the CDS rate and the bond spread should stay very
close to zero. This difference is called the “CDS-bond basis.”57 And
historically this spread has in fact hovered very close to 0.0%.
However, beginning in August 2007, bond yields started to widen
dramatically in comparison to CDS rates. This difference exploded
after the failure of Lehman Brothers.58
This extraordinary divergence is consistent with a collapse in
the supply of financing brought about by severe liquidity pressures. To
see why, consider an investor seeking to take a long position with
respect to a particular corporate credit. She has two main
alternatives: buy the issuer’s bonds, or sell protection in the CDS
54. Id. at 320.
55. Id. at 337.
56. When the CDS-bond basis is negative, an investor can profit by buying a bond and
simultaneously buying CDS protection on the bond. By entering into this trade, the investor will
effectively own a risk-free security with a yield that exceeds the risk-free rate.
57. It is sometimes referred to as the “cash-synthetic basis.”
58. Figure 1.8(D) infra shows the CDS-bond basis for high-grade credits only. This effect
was actually far more dramatic for lower-grade credits, but for ease of presentation this data is
not included.
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market. From a present-value perspective, these positions are
virtually identical. But the first option must be funded: the investor
needs to part with cash to obtain the bond. In the second option, the
investor parts with little or no cash up front.59 The CDS contract
entitles her to periodic payments, in return for which she agrees to
make a large contingent payment in the future if the debtor defaults.
The derivatives market is therefore called a “synthetic” market, as
opposed to a “cash” market.
It is easy to see why this funding distinction might become
critical during a liquidity crisis. Concerned about their ability to meet
money-claim redemptions, firms engaged in maturity transformation
would find themselves in cash-preservation mode. They would
therefore charge a significant premium to part with cash. Naturally,
this development should reduce aggregate investor demand in the
ordinary bond markets, where positions must be funded, relative to
the synthetic markets, where they are not. In that case the CDS-bond
basis would go negative—which is just what happened.
If this account is accurate, it has important implications for the
origination of new credit to real borrowers during a liquidity crisis.
The primary market for real credit is, of course, a cash market, not a
synthetic one. Borrowers issue into this market in order to rent
purchasing power from lenders. According to the account described
here, during a liquidity crisis, real borrowers will find that they must
pay a substantial premium for access to credit. This implies that costs
of financing during a liquidity crisis might be significantly in excess of
those justified by fundamentals.60 This view was widely held among
sophisticated market participants during the recent crisis.61
There is, then, compelling evidence that the liquidity shock did
indeed have an independent impact on the supply of new financing to
59. Technically, the writer of CDS protection is usually required to part with some cash up
front, in the form of “initial margin.” But this amount is typically only a small fraction of the
notional amount of the contract.
60. Under efficient market conditions, this divergence of course would not be expected to
happen. That is why the extraordinary CDS-bond basis during the recent crisis requires an
explanation. Existing scholarly work has stressed the “slow movement” of capital under crisis
conditions. See Darrell Duffie, Presidential Address: Asset Price Dynamics with Slow-Moving
Capital, 65 J. FIN. 1237 (2010); Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Arbitrage Crashes and the Speed
of Capital, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (the CDS-bond basis “highlight[s] the slow movement of
capital to extraordinary arbitrage opportunities”).
61. In a widely circulated research note, the elite hedge fund D.E. Shaw opined that “we
believe that [credit default] swap markets have often priced in a ‘truer’ level of the market’s
fundamental view on a particular issuer’s credit risk than that implied by prices of cash bonds
(although we don’t believe that this will necessarily always be the case).” The Basis Monster That
Ate Wall Street, THE D.E. SHAW GROUP MARKET INSIGHTS (D.E. Shaw, New York, N.Y.), Mar.
2009, at 7.
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the real economy. Of course, this is not to say that the liquidity shock
was solely responsible for the credit crunch. A more likely
interpretation is that the forces that caused the initial credit event
also independently exerted downward pressure on the supply of new
real credit—and that this would have happened even in the absence of
a liquidity crisis. In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that these
were mutually reinforcing phenomena. The initial credit event
triggered a liquidity event; the liquidity event further drove down
asset prices; the supply of new credit to the real economy decreased;
economic agents cut back on consumption and real investment;
market participants revised their expectations of economic
performance downward; these developments raised further doubts
about the ability of debtors to service their existing obligations,
driving prices of existing credit assets still lower; and so on.62 The
important point here is that the available evidence suggests that the
liquidity event was not epiphenomenal. Rather, the dramatic
reduction in the supply of long-term financing to real borrowers
during the crisis appears to have been attributable, in significant
measure, to the unraveling of the money-claim market.
It is useful to conclude this discussion with a brief review of the
most severe phase of the financial crisis, as well as the related policy
response and the path of macroeconomic performance. Lehman’s
bankruptcy in September 2008 triggered a broad panic in the market
for private money-claims. This panic was evident in the dramatic
widening of short-term funding spreads shown above in Figure 1.6.
More evidence for the severity of the post-Lehman panic is presented
here:

62. This cycle shows the limits of the landslide analogy, since landslides do not reinforce
storms.
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Figure 1.8: The Acute Phase and the Macroeconomic
Contraction
A) U.S. Prime Money Market Fund Shares Outstanding63

B) Federal Reserve Assets64

C) Monetary Policy and Treasury Yields65

D) U.S. Real GDP66
(annualized quarterly rates; chained 2005 dollars)

Lehman’s default triggered a run on the MMMF sector—one of
the core distribution channels for money-claim funding. Practically
overnight, investors withdrew nearly half a trillion dollars from prime
money market funds (panel A above). The free fall was halted only
after a massive policy response by government authorities. This
emergency response included an explosion of Federal Reserve liquidity
facilities (evident in panel B above). It also included an array of other
emergency measures, including a Treasury guarantee of the entire
MMMF sector; a new FDIC program to guarantee senior debt issued
by depositories and their affiliates; and, in early October, giant equity
infusions into the nation’s largest financial institutions through the
TARP program.

63. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 75 Chart 5.3.5.
64. Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases
/h41/ (last updated Aug. 23, 2012).
65. FRED Graph, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/
(last visited July 26, 2012) (graph of “DGS10,” “DFEDTAR,” and “DFEDTARL” data series).
66. Id. (graph of “GDPCA” and “GDPPOT” data series).
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These measures ultimately proved sufficient to arrest the
money-claim panic. By the following May, short-term funding spreads
had returned to precrisis levels. These emergency measures were
accompanied by extraordinary monetary policy initiatives by the Fed,
which cut the target federal funds rate (lower limit) to 0.0% (panel C)
and conducted additional expansionary monetary policy through socalled “quantitative easing” initiatives (evident in the buildup of
securities in panel B). However, while risk-free rates remained
remarkably low by historical standards—ten-year Treasuries
remained range bound from 2% to 4% for an extended period after
Lehman Brothers’ failure (panel C)—these measures were not enough
to avert an abrupt and severe macroeconomic contraction (panel D).
This Part has offered empirical evidence from the recent crisis
suggesting that money-claim panics have independent effects on the
functioning of the capital markets and real economic performance.
This conclusion has critical implications for regulatory design. It
suggests a prima facie case for a targeted government intervention to
stabilize the money-claim market. The next Part will expand on this
case by examining the dynamics of money-claim runs. An analysis of
these dynamics will generate important implications for the
remainder of the Article, which addresses questions of institutional
design.
C. Market Failure and the Equilibrium Selection Problem
I’m not an economist, but these are some fragile [expletive] businesses. No, don’t look
the bank in the eye, it will fail!
—Jon Stewart, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, 201067

Are the phenomena described above a market failure—or are
they just the market at work? If the cost of any feasible policy
intervention would exceed the likely benefit, then the assertion that
the market has failed is not very meaningful.
In Regulating Money Creation, the problem of money-claim
instability was analyzed as a basic collective action problem—a
signature of market failure.68 That argument can be summarized as
follows, in very brief form. It starts with the observation that moneyclaimants experience consequential losses when money-claim issuers
default. The loss of access to cash reserves can lead to operational

67. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Episode #15006 (Comedy Central television
broadcast Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-january-122010/clusterf--k-to-the-poor-house---wall-street-bonuses.
68. See Ricks, supra note 2, at 109–14.
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disruption, reputational damage, or even default. Notably, these
consequential losses are distinct from any impairment of the value of
the issuer’s asset portfolio. Nor do these losses relate to administrative
costs of insolvency. Instead, these consequential losses arise from
money-claimants’ abrupt loss of the “money services” that they had
received from owning money-claims (and which were, indeed, the very
rationale for owning money-claims in the first place).69 These losses
arise from the default itself.
Given this circumstance, money-claimants would seem to have
an incentive to reach a bargain to avoid default. The terms of such a
hypothetical bargain are easily imagined. Money-claimants might
agree up front never to run on an issuer under any circumstances—
even if they suspected that portfolio losses had wiped out its equity. In
operational terms, they would simply agree never to alter their deposit
and withdrawal behavior on account of perceptions about the issuer’s
solvency. The agreement would specify that, if the issuer were to
become balance-sheet insolvent, money-claimants and other financing
sources would take pro-rata haircuts (perhaps pennies on the dollar)
to recapitalize the firm on a going-concern basis. So long as moneyclaimants continued to deposit and withdraw as usual, the issuer
would be able to maintain an adequate cash reserve and continue its
operations during the restructuring procedure. This bargain would of
course do nothing to avert the issuer’s portfolio losses. But it would
enable money-claimants to avoid the consequential losses that they
experience upon default. Presumably such a bargain, which amounts
to a prenegotiated going-concern restructuring, would be significantly
welfare enhancing.
Regulating Money Creation suggested that, due to transactions
costs and impediments to enforcement, reaching such an agreement
would not be practically feasible. If any given money-claimant doubted
that others would honor the deal, she would have an incentive to skew
toward withdrawals in order to limit her exposure. A defection by even
a small number of money-claimants would exhaust the issuer’s cash
reserves, resulting in default and consequential losses for the
remaining money-claimants. As a result, the effectiveness of the
bargain would depend crucially on the ability to impose meaningful
penalties for breach. And establishing breach would be extremely factintensive: the fact-finder would need to determine that the money69. For a discussion of the “money services” provided by short-term obligations (including
empirical evidence), see Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, A
Comparative-Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity 35 (Harvard Bus. Sch. - Fin.
Unit, Working Paper No. 1680604, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1680604.
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claimant withdrew (or refrained from depositing) more than she would
have under normal circumstances. This would be a difficult task.
Without a meaningful enforcement threat against potentially tens of
thousands of individual money-claimants, the hypothetical bargain
would not work.70
A collective action problem like the one described here
establishes a prima facie case for government intervention. However,
the question remains whether policy intervention can make matters
better. In this regard, it is worth considering whether there might in
fact be an upside to instability. Specifically, the prospect of runs exerts
market discipline on issuers, encouraging them to allocate resources
carefully and avoid significant portfolio impairments.71 Under this
view, runs and panics represent healthy responses to issuers’ unwise
investment decisions. If policy intervention removed the incentive to
panic, it would remove this valuable market discipline. The cost of
intervention might then exceed the benefit.
Are runs healthy? To address this question, it is important to
examine the peculiar dynamics of run-behavior. In an influential
article, Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig analyzed the dynamics of
bank runs through the lens of game theory.72 Bank depositors in their
model are playing what game theorists call a “coordination game.”73
The Diamond-Dybvig model is formal, but the basic intuition is easily
grasped. Stated simply, depositors normally benefit from holding
deposit instruments, but they have an incentive to withdraw if they
believe there to be a high enough probability that other depositors will
withdraw in numbers sufficient to cause the bank to default. The
outcome therefore has a self-fulfilling aspect: money-claimants will
run if they expect other money-claimants to run.
Situating the phenomenon in a game-theoretic context proves
illuminating. Coordination games have “multiple equilibria,” meaning
that money-claimants face more than one set of mutually stable
strategies. In the Diamond-Dybvig bank game, there are two
70. Regulating Money Creation also offered reasons to think that private insurance is not
likely to be an efficient alternative; that discussion will not be repeated here. Ricks, supra note 2.
71. See Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation,
and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking, 109 J. POL. ECON. 287, 317 (2001).
72. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983).
73. In elementary game theory, the basic version of a coordination game is the so-called
“Stag Hunt.” A good description of this game is available on Wikipedia. Stag Hunt, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stag_hunt (last visited July 26, 2012). For a more detailed gametheoretic analysis of bank runs, including a comparison with the Stag Hunt game, see Morgan
Ricks, “Moneyness” and Bank Runs, in INSIDE MONEY (Christine Desan ed., U. Penn. Press,
forthcoming 2013).
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equilibria: a “stable equilibrium” and a “run equilibrium.” Which
equilibrium will prevail? This question encapsulates what game
theorists call the equilibrium selection problem. And an important
insight from game theory is that equilibrium selection in a
coordination game does not necessarily depend upon any fundamental
aspect of the situation. Indeed, it can be completely random. Thus
Diamond and Dybvig observe that equilibrium selection in their model
might depend upon “some commonly observed random variable in the
economy”74:
This could be a bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at some other bank, a
negative government forecast, or even sunspots. . . . The observed variable need not
convey anything fundamental about the bank’s condition. The problem is that once
agents have deposited, anything that causes them to anticipate a run will lead to a run.
This implies that banks with pure demand deposit contracts will be very concerned
about maintaining confidence because they realize that the good equilibrium is very
fragile.75

This approach to thinking about equilibrium selection was
pioneered by Nobel Prize-winning economist and political scientist
Thomas Schelling. In his classic work, The Strategy of Conflict,
Schelling suggested that the choice among equilibria in a coordination
game is determined by a “clue” or “focal point” that leads players to
believe that other players will choose a particular strategy. According
to Schelling, the prominence of any such focal point is not a question
of rationality. Instead, it “may depend on imagination more than on
logic.”76 As Schelling describes it:
[S]ome essential part of the study of [coordination] games is necessarily empirical. . . .
There is, consequently, no way that an analyst can reproduce the whole decision process
either introspectively or by an axiomatic method. . . . One cannot, without empirical
evidence, deduce what understandings can be perceived in a nonzero-sum game of
maneuver [i.e., a coordination game] any more than one can prove, by purely formal
deduction, that a particular joke is bound to be funny.77

Because focal points are necessarily contextual and therefore
extrinsic to the game, they may have no fundamental significance at
all—which is why economists sometimes refer to them as “sunspots.”
Such focal points affect outcomes simply because they are expected to.
According to one contemporary game theorist, when it comes to
solving coordination games, “the final court of appeal is the psychology
laboratory.”78
74.
75.
76.
1960).
77.
78.

Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 72, at 410.
Id.
THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57 (1980) (originally published in
Id. at 162−64.
KEN BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 36 (2005).
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It is obvious that, if runs and panics by money-claimants were
purely random phenomena, they could have no redeeming value in
terms of incentives or otherwise. In the real world, however, moneyclaim runs do not appear to be entirely random. Casual empiricism
suggests that runs virtually never commence except under
circumstances in which there have been significant portfolio
impairments. Still, it seems equally true that the degree of
fundamental deterioration that will trigger a run at any given
institution is not knowable in advance with any degree of precision. At
some point, initial withdrawals will mount, the institution’s cash
reserves will decline, others money-claimants will sense danger, and
the institution will tip toward a self-perpetuating liquidity crisis. The
lesson from game theory is that there is no “rational” point at which
this process will start.
Furthermore, if Diamond and Dybvig are correct that a
“commonly observed run at some other bank” may be a natural focal
point, then a default by any one institution may trigger systemic
consequences—widespread, self-reinforcing panic behavior targeting
other money-claim issuers. This observation suggests why it may not
be useful to describe panics as “irrational.” Equilibrium selection in a
coordination game is simply not a question of rationality. As Diamond
and Dybvig note, “a bank run in our model is caused by a shift in
expectations, which could depend on almost anything, consistent with
the apparently irrational observed behavior of people running on
banks.”79 A June 2008 fixed-income research report from J.P. Morgan
makes a similar point:
As we have seen demonstrated through the past several months of this crisis, actions
that short-term investors view as rational behavior does [sic] not always align with what
other investors might view as rational. As we have pointed out previously, the liquidity
focused investors that control most of the money in the short-term markets care mainly
about being able to get their money back when they want it. John Maynard Keynes
might have explained these investors’ behavior in these previous cases as “animal
spirits,” a spontaneous urge to action rather than a calculated outcome of weighted
average of benefits and probabilities. We prefer to think of these previous episodes as
rational reactions viewed through the lens of different priorities.80

This analysis of the dynamics of run-behavior has interesting
implications with respect to the social value of “market discipline” by
money-claimants. Market discipline is not usually thought to be an
end in itself, but rather a means to the end of efficient resource
79. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 72, at 404.
80. Short-Term Fixed Income Research Note, U.S. FIXED INCOME MARKETS WEEKLY (J.P.
Morgan Sec. Inc., New York, N.Y.), June 6, 2008 (emphasis added). Notably, this report was
issued after the run on Bear Stearns in March 2008 but before the most acute stage of the
financial crisis in the fall of that year.
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allocation. However, the analysis above suggests that moneyclaimants’ incentives to conduct fundamental investment analysis
might be rather limited. Fundamental credit analysis is expensive, but
money-claimants can get an approximate sense of an issuer’s
fundamental condition without much effort. They can outsource credit
analysis by observing credit ratings; they can examine the market
yields on the issuer’s long-term debt securities; they can compile
cursory credit metrics; and so on. If money-claimants are involved in a
coordination game, anything more than an approximate sense of
fundamental condition might not be particularly useful. After all, the
degree of fundamental deterioration that will trigger a run is not
knowable in advance. Accordingly, the marginal benefit of credit
analysis might not exceed the marginal cost.
Is this prediction of limited investment analysis in the moneyclaim market borne out in practice? Consider these observations from
the leading money market reference work, Stigum’s Money Market.
“One might expect most institutional [short-term] portfolios to be
managed with considerable sophistication,” the authors say.81 But
“[m]any short-term portfolios are not managed as well as they could
be, and some are not managed at all.”82 They go on: “Some of the
ablest [short-term] portfolio managers tend to steer clear of credit
analysis.”83 In fact, “a good portfolio manager can, as many do, refuse
to get into credit analysis . . . .”84 According to the authors, cash
management departments in the nonfinancial corporate sector are
particularly inattentive: “In the case of corporations, management will
often adopt the attitude: we’re in the business of manufacturing
widgets, not investing. . . . In small institutions, it is common for the
liquidity portfolio to be managed by someone who wears several hats
and who, in particular, is not a money market specialist.”85
If money-claimants perform little or no fundamental credit
analysis, how do they make asset allocation decisions? The answer is
that they rely largely on readily available indicators, including credit
ratings. Indeed, major market participants occasionally acknowledge
this point. The J.P. Morgan research report cited above notes that
“[n]early all of these liquidity-focused [short-term] investors are credit
rating sensitive and are more attuned to the opinions of S&P and

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

MARCIA STIGUM & ANTHONY CRESCENZI, STIGUM’S MONEY MARKET 455 (4th ed. 2007).
Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 478, 483.
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Moody’s than they are of the other rating agencies.”86 Credit ratings
are not the only focal point, but they play a particularly important role
in this market.
Gary Gorton and other economists use the term
“informationally insensitive” to describe financial instruments, such
as money-claims, on which detailed credit analysis is generally not
worthwhile. According to Gorton:
Broadly speaking, [informationally insensitive] debt does not really correspond to the
textbook descriptions of “efficient markets,” a notion that is basically about stock
markets. . . . [It] is sold based almost exclusively on its rating. . . . Intuitively,
informationally-insensitive debt is debt that no one need devote a lot of resources to
investigating. It is exactly designed to avoid that.87

The proposition that money-claimants rely heavily on credit
ratings and typically perform only cursory investment research is
conventional wisdom in the financial markets. The argument here is
that this tendency is largely attributable to inherent structural
features of the money-claim market—structural features that are not
present in other areas of the financial markets. Stated simply, if
money-claimants are involved in a coordination game, then they may
find that the marginal benefit of significant investment analysis does
not exceed its marginal cost. Their focus will instead be primarily
horizontal in nature—focused on what other money-claimants are
likely to do. There is reason to question whether this unusual variety
of market “discipline” is conducive to efficient resource allocation.
Perhaps, then, policy intervention that diminished this form of market
discipline would not be so costly after all.
Finally, there is one other dimension of this analysis that will
prove important in the remainder of this Article. The issue relates to
optimal regulatory design. In particular, the next two Parts will show
that the prevailing modes of stability-oriented regulatory intervention
depend crucially upon the ability of regulators to make reasonably
accurate “systemic” judgments about the likely consequences of
default by money-claim issuers. Parts II and III will argue that the
dynamics of run-behavior described here—the fact that moneyclaimants are involved in a coordination game, giving rise to an
equilibrium selection problem—make such systemic predictions highly
problematic. By contrast, Part IV will show that the PPP regime does
not suffer from this problem—one of its key virtues. This observation

86. Short-Term Fixed Income Research Note, supra note 80.
87. GARY GORTON, SLAPPED IN THE FACE BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: BANKING AND THE PANIC
OF 2007, at 9–10 (2009) (emphasis added).
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provides a useful transition to the question of regulatory design, which
is the subject of the remainder of the Article.
II.

THE SOCIAL COST OF RISK REGULATION

Part I developed a prima facie case for government
intervention to stabilize the market for money-claims. The rest of the
Article will examine alternative modes of intervention. Three
alternatives will be considered: (1) risk-constraint regulation, such as
portfolio restrictions and capital requirements; (2) conditional support
facilities, such as the lender of last resort; and (3) the public-private
partnership system. These three approaches will be evaluated in turn.
There is an analytical logic to this sequence, but also a
historical one. In the United States, the federal regulation of
depository banking has proceeded through three broad phases. The
first phase employed a risk-constraint approach. The National Bank
Act of 1864 created a new category of federally chartered banks and
required them to abide by a detailed and comprehensive array of
regulatory risk constraints, including portfolio restrictions and capital
requirements.88 In the second phase, Congress introduced conditional
liquidity support. Established in 1913, the Federal Reserve system
was endowed with lender-of-last-resort powers, enabling it to support
depository banks during a liquidity crisis.89 Finally, after the banking
panics of the early 1930s, deposit insurance legislation was enacted in
1933 and 1934.90 This legislation ushered in the third and final phase,
the public-private partnership regime for depository banking. That
regime remains operative today for depository banks, in somewhat
modified form.
This Part evaluates the first of these alternatives, that is,
regulatory risk constraints. In particular, it considers two key forms of
substantive risk constraint that are widely employed in financial
regulation: portfolio restrictions (sometimes called activity
restrictions) and capital requirements (or leverage limitations). The
primary aim of these tools is to reduce the likelihood that an issuer’s
assets will fall dangerously close to or below the value of its liabilities,

88. See National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
89. See Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
90. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the FDIC as a temporary agency); Banking Act of
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, 49 Stat. 684 (establishing the FDIC as a permanent agency) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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a condition referred to herein as “balance-sheet insolvency,” as distinct
from cash-flow insolvency.
In keeping with the functional perspective of Part I, the
analysis that follows will assume that these regulatory risk
constraints are applied to all money-claim issuers—that is, all firms
engaged in maturity transformation. Logically, this implies that firms
declining to abide by these risk constraints would be legally prohibited
from issuing money-claims. Such firms would be required to finance
themselves in the capital markets.
A. A Simple Diagrammatic Model
To facilitate the analysis below, it will be useful to introduce
the simplest of microeconomic models, in the form of a basic diagram.
This model will prove surprisingly useful in analyzing different
regulatory responses to the problem of money-claim instability.
The diagram is a simple model of the firm—in this case, the
money-claim issuer or “maturity-transformation firm.” The firm
finances itself by issuing a large amount of money-claims and a
smaller amount of common equity (a residual, subordinated claim).91
The common shareholders control the firm, and they seek profitmaximization. The firm earns a profit by investing in the capital
markets, for example, loans and securities. For simplicity, the firm is
assumed to earn no fee income. All of its earnings come from its
“spread” business.
The following figure illustrates the equilibrium production of
the firm in the absence of government intervention:

91. The introduction of long-term debt into the capital structure would complicate the
exposition without materially altering the conclusions.
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Figure 2.1: Simple Model of the Maturity-Transformation Firm

The firm’s marginal cost curve represents its total weighted
average cost of funds (Rt)—that is, its all-in cost of financing,
including the cost of equity. The firm’s cost of money-claim funding is
also shown (Rm). Naturally, this curve sits below the firm’s weighted
average cost of funds. However, it sits above the short-term risk-free
rate (Rf) since the firm has a positive probability of defaulting on its
money-claims. The cost curves are horizontal, reflecting the
simplifying assumption that the firm’s financing costs do not change
as it increases production, all else equal.92
The marginal revenue curve represents the yield that the firm
earns on its asset portfolio. This curve is downward sloping, a
standard assumption. The profit-maximizing firm deploys its
financing proceeds first toward higher-value business opportunities
(those investments with the highest expected risk-adjusted returns),
then progressively toward lower-value opportunities. Importantly, this
downward slope implies that the capital markets in which the firm
invests are not perfectly competitive. That is, the firm can identify and
capitalize on “mispriced” assets within its field of specialization—
through superior analysis, a well-developed distribution infrastructure
(such as a branch network in the case of a consumer bank), an

92. That is, holding constant the firm’s ratio of equity to assets (its capital ratio) and its
aggregate asset riskiness (volatility). The effects of changes in these two parameters will be
explored presently.
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identifiable brand that attracts customers seeking financing, or some
combination of these sorts of advantages.
The intersection of the marginal cost and marginal revenue
curves determines the profit-maximizing quantity of production. The
maturity-transformation firm “produces” its investment portfolio. It
ceases further production at the point at which the expected marginal
revenue derived from additional investment equals the marginal cost
of financing—in other words, when it can identify no further
investments with positive net present value. The firm’s economic
profit is depicted by the shaded area, representing the difference
between the yield earned by the firm on its investment portfolio and
its weighted average cost of funds. These profits represent economic
surplus: value-creation (gains from trade) from maturity
transformation.93
Part I argued that maturity transformation is associated with a
market failure. This market failure can be understood as the
generation of negative externalities—“run-externalities”—that are
external to the model. These run-externalities might have been
incorporated into the diagram through a “social cost” curve that sits
somewhere above the firm’s (private) marginal cost curve. This social
cost curve is omitted for two reasons. First, it would clutter the
diagram and complicate the exposition. Second, and more importantly,
one of the key takeaways from the discussion of equilibrium selection
in Part I was that the dynamics of run-behavior make this curve very
difficult to locate. To depict the social cost curve in the model would
lend it an aura of false precision.
With this basic model in hand, this Article now turns to a
consideration of the efficiency characteristics of regulatory risk
constraints.
B. Portfolio Restrictions
First, the effects of portfolio restrictions are considered. This
class of regulation precludes issuers from owning designated types of
risky assets and from conducting risky activities. (For example, with
some narrow exceptions, depository banks are prohibited under
current law from owning equity securities, investing in real estate,
93. To be precise, the profits of maturity-transformation firms represent producer surplus.
Additional economic surplus accrues to both the firm’s suppliers of funds (to the extent that any
of them would have accepted a lower yield) and to the agents in which the firm invests (to the
extent that any of them would have been willing to pay higher yields). These other forms of
surplus are not depicted in the diagram, but they can reasonably be assumed to be directly
proportional to producer surplus.
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and directly engaging in most commercial activities.94) This class of
regulation also includes concentration limits and diversification
requirements.95 Broadly speaking, these restrictions are intended to
reduce the aggregate risk (or volatility) of issuers’ asset portfolios.
Portfolio restrictions are conceptually distinct from restrictions
on affiliations—such as those embodied in the old Glass-Steagall
regime and the new Volcker Rule. Affiliation restrictions are designed
to limit the types of activities that may be carried on within a
corporate group that includes a depository bank, even if the activity in
question is not conducted within the depository bank. Because this
Article is concerned with the direct substantive regulation of maturity
transformation, the question of affiliations falls outside the scope of its
analysis.96
Portfolio restrictions should be expected to reduce the
likelihood of default and, therefore, to reduce the run-externalities
associated with maturity transformation. However, they also require
the firm to forego its chosen revenue opportunities. The effect of
portfolio restrictions can be illustrated in the model as follows:

94. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006) (corporate powers of national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 29 (power of
national banks to hold real property); 12 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2012) (permissible investment securities
for national banks); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ACTIVITIES
PERMISSIBLE FOR A NATIONAL BANK, CUMULATIVE, 2011 ANNUAL EDITION (2012), available at
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/bankact.pdf.
These restrictions apply to federally chartered banks, but similar restrictions apply to state
chartered banks.
95. See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a).
96. In the author’s view, the importance of affiliations has been vastly overemphasized and
has served to distract attention away from the fundamental question of how the activity of
maturity transformation should be addressed as a substantive matter. No one would suggest
that the damage from the Lehman Brothers failure arose from its ownership of a tiny thrift
institution. Yet the Volcker Rule is premised on the notion that systemic safety can be materially
enhanced by “structurally” separating depository institutions from certain other activities—as
though affiliations among different types of institutions were among the core problems. This
anachronistic line of reasoning seems to have a persistent hold. Witness the new “ring-fencing”
proposal from the U.K.’s Independent Commission on Banking, which envisions a form of
structural separation between retail banking and wholesale banking. See INDEPENDENT COMM’N
ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT 35–77 (2011), available at http://bankingcommission.
independent.gov.uk/. To the extent that one accepts the account of market failure described in
Part I of this Article, restrictions on affiliations and ring-fencing proposals must be viewed as
nonresponsive to the fundamental problem.
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Figure 2.2: Portfolio Restrictions

With portfolio restrictions, the marginal revenue curve shifts
leftward: requiring the firm to forego its chosen revenue opportunities
reduces its profits at any given level of production. The marginal cost
curve shifts downward: insofar as the portfolio restrictions are
effective, the firm’s likelihood of default decreases, thereby reducing
the firm’s financing costs. It is evident that the shifts in these two
curves have countervailing effects on firm profits. However, with
portfolio restrictions, we should expect the firm’s profits to be lower
than they were in the absence of intervention. Otherwise, a rational
firm would self-impose such constraints.
Imposing portfolio restrictions therefore reduces the total
economic
surplus
generated
by
maturity
transformation.
Nevertheless, portfolio restrictions might increase overall economic
efficiency if this reduction in economic surplus were outweighed by a
corresponding reduction in run-externalities. Portfolio restrictions
therefore present a tradeoff. An efficient calibration of portfolio
restrictions would maximize the difference between (1) the value of
such restrictions in terms of reducing run-externalities and (2) the
cost of such restrictions in terms of reducing economic surplus from
maturity transformation.
How might such an objective function be operationalized?
Estimating the value of portfolio restrictions presents extraordinary
practical challenges. It requires that regulators possess the capacity to
assess, for any given level of portfolio restrictions, both the likelihood
that issuers will default and the extent of run-externalities that would
be generated thereby. The dynamics of run-behavior discussed in Part
I.C make both of these assessments extremely problematic. Because
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money-claimants are engaged in a coordination game, there is no way
to determine what degree of fundamental deterioration will trigger a
run. More importantly, no reliable method exists to predict what the
consequences will be if a run does occur. (Consider the fact that senior
government officials believed that the market was prepared for a
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.97) Suppose that, as Diamond and
Dybvig suggest, a “commonly observed run” at one issuer is a potential
focal point for money-claimants of other issuers.98 Would moneyclaimants stage runs on other issuers if a given issuer defaulted? As a
precautionary measure, would maturity-transformation firms then
broadly reduce their exposures to the capital markets, causing a sharp
reduction in the supply of financing? How might these developments
affect aggregate economic activity? No model exists for answering
these kinds of questions. The dynamics of run-behavior are inherently
unpredictable, and the complexity of the financial system places these
types of questions well beyond our calculative abilities.
These circumstances present a serious policy problem. If
portfolio restrictions have a real social cost in terms of reducing
economic surplus, as suggested in the diagram above, and if there is
no reliable way to estimate the corresponding benefit, then the
efficiency-maximizing level of portfolio restrictions is uncertain.
Regulators might respond to this uncertainty by erring on the side of
caution, imposing very onerous portfolio restrictions on money-claim
issuers.99 But erring in this direction would be costly; highly onerous
constraints would have meaningful consequences for credit
availability and economic growth. Conversely, erring toward leniency
will preserve more economic surplus, but only at the cost of higher
run-externalities—and reducing run-externalities was the reason for
imposing portfolio restrictions in the first place.

97. See, e.g., DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 11 (2009) (“With Lehman clearly struggling
for survival, Paulson and Bernanke assured each other—and others on the call—that all the
companies and traders that did business with Lehman had been given time to protect themselves
from a possible Lehman bankruptcy.”); id. at 21 (“One Fed official confided later in September
that he had acquiesced in the decision to let Lehman go. Why? ‘Because I thought people had
anticipated it. They [Lehman Brothers] were still very big [but] they had shrunk a lot. It was
time to find out what would happen if we didn’t stand behind all these guys. It had been a long
time coming.’ With hindsight, that tough-guy stance looked, at best, naïve.”).
98. See supra Part I.C.
99. In the extreme case, portfolio restrictions would permit money-claim issuers to own
nothing but cash—a proposal sometimes referred to as “100% reserve banking.” This proposal
would prohibit maturity transformation. The economy’s pooled cash reserves would sit idle. Runexternalities would be eliminated, but only at the expense of removing a huge amount of
resources from the capital markets.
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C. Capital Requirements
The foregoing analysis is easily extended to capital
requirements. The following Figure illustrates the effect of capital
requirements on the economic surplus generated by maturitytransformation firms:
Figure 2.3: Capital Requirements

In this Figure, capital requirements shift the marginal cost
curve upward: the firm’s weighted average cost of financing increases
to the extent that it is required to increase the proportion of equity
(and therefore reduce the proportion of cheaper money-claims) in its
financing structure. The quantity of production decreases, and
economic surplus shrinks.
This conclusion is not universally accepted. Indeed, standard
corporate finance principles suggest that, in the absence of tax effects
and other artificial distortions, the firm’s overall cost of financing
should be unaffected by its financing structure.100 This topic was
addressed at some length in Regulating Money Creation. Without
repeating that argument here, it is worth noting that this objection
implies that maturity transformation per se does not generate

100. This is the Modigliani-Miller theorem, a cornerstone of modern finance theory. See
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory
of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). For an argument that questions whether higher
capital requirements generate social costs, see Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts,
and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive (The Rock
Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper Series No. 86, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1669704.
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economic value.101 Like Regulating Money Creation, this Article takes
the position that economic agents derive instrumental value from the
ability to park cash in liquid financial assets whose value relative to
currency is extremely stable. These instruments provide a unique
“money service” that is not available in other financial instruments,
and they pay exceptionally low yields.
Accordingly, in the model shown here, capital requirements
reduce the total economic surplus generated by maturity
transformation. Nevertheless, as in the case of portfolio restrictions,
capital requirements would increase overall economic efficiency if this
surplus reduction were outweighed by a corresponding reduction in
run-externalities. In this regard, regulators face exactly the same
difficulty that was discussed above in the context of portfolio
restrictions. Without a reliable way to judge the effect of capital
requirements on both the likelihood and the consequences of future
run-behavior, regulators face daunting challenges in finding an
optimal calibration. Erring in either direction is costly.
The practical significance of these implementation challenges
would be difficult to overemphasize. Without the ability to conduct
meaningful cost-benefit analyses of portfolio restrictions and capital
requirements, regulators are left to proceed on the basis of
impressionistic judgments, speculative analysis, and “gut feel.” As a
result, the prospects for the successful, cost-effective prevention of
money-claim panics through ex ante risk constraints alone are not
promising. It is perhaps for this reason that, for nearly a century, U.S.
financial regulation has supplemented regulatory risk constraints
with ex post liquidity facilities to support money-claim issuers (or, at
least, depository banks) in the event of a liquidity crisis. This Article
now turns to an examination of this approach.
III.

CONDITIONAL SUPPORT AND SUBSIDIZED FINANCE

Someday you guys are going to need to tell me how we ended up with a system like
this. . . . [W]e’re not doing something right if we’re stuck with these miserable choices.
—George W. Bush, September 16, 2008102
Like other financial institutions, Goldman Sachs received an investment from the
government as a part of its various efforts to fortify our markets and the economy

101. If this were the case, then the problem of money-claim panics could easily be solved by
outlawing money-claim issuance altogether.
102. James B. Stewart, Eight Days, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 72. The President was
reportedly speaking to Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke.
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during a very difficult time. I want to express my gratitude and the gratitude of our
entire firm.
—Lloyd Blankfein (CEO of Goldman Sachs), 2010103

Evaluating ex ante risk constraints in isolation may be largely
academic. Arguably, the government cannot credibly commit never to
provide ex post support in the event of a panic. To quote economists
Robert Merton and Zvi Bodie:
No matter how firm the government’s commitment to relying on private markets, there
is a problem of time inconsistency that limits their effectiveness. . . . [U]nder certain
circumstances, it is socially optimal for the government to renege on its threat to allow
banks to fail. . . . The government, therefore, is caught in a paradox of power. For
market discipline to work, the government must bind itself convincingly not to bail out
banks that get into trouble. But the government is too powerful not to intervene.
Everyone knows that since government makes the rules, it can change them, too.
Indeed, only an incompetent government would not intervene to stop a panic. But if the
government will bail out depositors ex post, then there is implicit insurance, even if
there is no explicit insurance ex ante.104

This Part considers the efficiency implications of ex post
support facilities, which may be used alone or in combination with ex
ante risk constraints. For purposes of the discussion that follows, ex
post support can be understood as liquidity support from the central
bank, that is, lender-of-last-resort authority.105
A. Conditionality and Funding Subsidy
It is obvious that unconditional liquidity support—a
government commitment to always lend to certain firms if needed to
prevent them from defaulting—would be equivalent to a government
guarantee from the perspective of those firms’ creditors. For
illustrative purposes, it is useful to begin by considering this extreme,
unconditional version of ex post support:

103. Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks, Hearing Before the
Permanent S. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 111th Cong. 130–31 (2010).
104. Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Deposit Insurance Reform: A Functional Approach, 38
CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL’Y 6 n.16 (1993).
105. As detailed above, during the recent crisis ex post support also took the form of equity
capital infusions and guarantee facilities for broad segments of the financial sector. These
alternative modes of intervention originated from the Treasury Department and the FDIC, not
the Federal Reserve. For present purposes, these distinctions are not significant. These
alternative modes of intervention are conceptually similar to the lender of last resort, and the
analysis that follows will not treat them separately.
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Figure 2.4: Unconditional Ex Post Support

With unconditional support, the firm’s cost of money-claim
funding declines to its theoretical minimum, the risk-free rate (the xaxis). The firm’s marginal cost curve shifts downward substantially.
The quantity of production increases correspondingly.
Unconditional ex post support self-evidently eliminates runexternalities, as money-claim defaults are ruled out by definition. In
effect, money-claims are guaranteed. Economic surplus (light gray
area) remains unaffected. However, unconditional ex post support also
creates a funding subsidy to the firm (dark gray area). The firm’s
lower cost of financing enhances its profitability on existing
investments and enables it to profit from lower-value, and previously
uneconomic, investment opportunities. The funding subsidy is
extracted by the firm from the government. It represents an inefficient
resource allocation.
The diagram above can be understood as a depiction of the “too
big to fail” phenomenon—the notion that some institutions will not be
allowed to default under any circumstances. Whether this regime of
unconditional ex post support is superior to a laissez-faire regime
depends on whether the costs of such support (in terms of funding
subsidies) are outweighed by its economic benefits (in terms of
reducing
run-externalities).
Understandably,
though,
this
unconditional approach has few advocates, as it results in extreme
subsidies to the financial sector.
One way to reduce the funding subsidy associated with ex post
support would be to make that support conditional. Under this
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version, the central bank declines to furnish ex post support to halt a
run under certain circumstances. (The specification of these conditions
will be a central question.) The effects of this conditional approach can
be illustrated as follows:
Figure 2.5: Conditional Ex Post Support

The prospect of ex post support effects a downward shift in the
firm’s money-claim funding curve: by virtue of the reduced probability
of default, money-claimants are willing to accept lower yields.
However, the cost of money-claim funding does not decline to the riskfree rate, because the firm still has a positive probability of default.
The firm’s marginal cost curve shifts downward, and the equilibrium
quantity of production increases. These results are intuitive.
Like unconditional support, conditional support leaves the
original economic surplus intact (light gray area). It also creates a
funding subsidy (dark gray area), albeit a smaller one than under the
unconditional approach. The size of this subsidy depends on the
likelihood that, under a run-scenario, the government will intervene to
support the firm.106 However, the conditional approach does not
completely eliminate run-externalities. Defaults by money-claim
issuers will be allowed to happen under some circumstances. Whether
the conditional approach is superior to the unconditional approach
depends on whether the benefit of lower subsidies outweighs the
higher (that is, nonzero) run-externalities.
106. It is assumed that there is no informational asymmetry between the government and
the market in this regard. That is, the central bank cannot be expected to successfully “bluff” the
money-claim market regarding the likelihood of intervention—at least not forever.
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In this regard, the nature of the conditions is critical. It is
generally agreed that the central bank’s exercise of its lending powers
should be rule-based. Specifically, it is commonly argued that the
central bank should lend only against prespecified forms of highquality collateral and only at prespecified haircuts.107 If the liquidity
afforded under these rules is insufficient to meet the cash
requirements of a given firm in distress, the firm should be allowed to
default.
It is not obvious why such a policy—referred to herein as the
“collateral policy”—should be expected to be efficiency-maximizing.
There is little basis to suppose that defaults by firms that are unable
to meet the central bank’s collateral requirements during a liquidity
crisis will not generate very serious run-externalities. (Consider again
the example of Lehman Brothers.108) Nor is there any reason in theory
to expect that the central bank’s commitment to a strict collateral
policy, even if credible, would induce maturity-transformation firms to
fully “back” their money-claim funding with assets that the central
bank has indicated are acceptable collateral. In fact, the history of
fractional-reserve banking appears to offer conclusive empirical
evidence to the contrary.109 To be sure, a strict collateral policy will
107. The term “haircut” refers to the difference between the value of the collateral and the
face amount of the loan secured by that collateral.
108. Federal Reserve officials have stated that Lehman Brothers had insufficient highquality collateral to create a legal basis to lend to the firm in sufficient size to prevent default—
to use Bernanke’s formulation, the Federal Reserve would have been “lending into a run.” There
is no reason to doubt the veracity of these statements. But they highlight the point made here,
which is that collateral and solvency conditions to the exercise of lender-of-last-resort authority
represent an impediment to the government’s ability to minimize run-externalities—unless we
accept the doubtful proposition that defaults by firms that do not meet such conditions will for
some reason never produce serious negative consequences. One might have supposed that
“lending into a run” was the point of lender-of-last-resort powers.
109. To the extent that maturity-transformation firms must forego their preferred
investment opportunities in order to own more eligible collateral, they incur an opportunity cost.
Firms must weigh this cost against the expected value of liquidity support. It is not obvious that
the expected benefit would exceed the cost. When the Federal Reserve system was established in
1913, it was widely assumed that state banks would choose to join the system in order to have
access to lender-of-last-resort support. However, as of 1922, only 15% of eligible state banks had
joined the system—and the trend was toward withdrawal from the system. See Charles S.
Tippetts, State Bank Withdrawals from the Federal Reserve System, 13 AM. ECON. REV. 401, 402
n.6 (1923) (noting that of the 11,326 eligible state banks, only 1,648 banks were members of the
Federal Reserve system). Membership in the system required state banks to abide by modestly
higher cash reserve requirements than were required under most state laws. According to one
contemporaneous account:
Probably the reason most frequently [given] for giving up membership has been the
loss of interest on the reserve balance which must be kept with the federal reserve
bank. . . . Many [banks] regard the loss as payment for insurance, and cheap
insurance at that. But many member banks . . . claim that the protection given is
charged at too high a rate.
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limit subsidies and reduce the likelihood that the central bank will
incur losses. But it will do so only at the expense of allowing greater
run-externalities, the mitigation of which was the reason for
establishing ex post support facilities in the first place. On the other
hand, the more liberal the collateral policy, the more the system will
resemble the unconditional support scenario described above, with
large subsidies.
An alternative to the collateral policy would be to condition
liquidity support on the balance-sheet solvency of the institution as a
whole. While this “solvency policy” bears a superficial resemblance to
the collateral policy, it has far different implications. First, to the
extent that one places value on the incentive effects of market
discipline by money-claimants, the solvency policy nullifies that value.
The issuer does not default so long as the central bank views it to be
fundamentally solvent; the central bank’s discipline is substituted for
money-claimants’ discipline. Second, this solvency policy necessitates
a more expansive set of institutional capacities from the central bank
than the collateral policy described above. In order to assess
fundamental solvency, the central bank must be capable of evaluating
whatever asset portfolio the distressed money-claim issuer happens to
own. The collateral policy, by contrast, contemplates lending only
against familiar, prespecified classes of (presumably) relatively lowrisk assets.
There is, however, one important characteristic that the
collateral policy and the solvency policy have in common. By design,
these rule-based regimes take no account of the expected runexternalities that might result from declining to lend in any particular
case. Such externalities do not figure into the analysis of collateral
adequacy or firm solvency. On reflection, this omission is odd, since
the reduction of run-externalities was the rationale for establishing ex
post support facilities in the first place.
This latter point raises a third alternative: the abandonment of
a rule-based regime in favor of an ad hoc, case-by-case analysis of
costs and benefits. This kind of multifactor analysis might take
expected run-externalities into account. As such, it would suffer from
deficiencies of its own. The first deficiency relates to the fundamental
calibration problem discussed above in the context of ex ante risk
constraints. The dynamics of run-behavior are such that no remotely
reliable method exists to predict the consequences of default by a
maturity-transformation firm. In the absence of such a method,
regulators are left to rely on an inherently error-prone, gut-feel
Id. at 404–05.
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approach. Erring on the side of action generates inefficient subsidies.
Erring toward inaction leaves intact the run-externalities that the ex
post support regime was intended to reduce.
There is a second problem with this discretionary, ad hoc
policy. As shown in the diagrams above, the quantity of production by
a money-claim issuer is an increasing function of the likelihood of ex
post support. (The more likely the support, the lower the marginal cost
curve.) However, under the discretionary policy, the reverse should
also be true: the likelihood of support should be an increasing function
of the firm’s production. This is because, all else equal, defaults by
larger money-claim issuers should generate larger negative
externalities than defaults by smaller ones. This circumstance leads to
a perverse result. The initial introduction of possible ex post support
shifts the marginal cost curve downward and increases the firm’s
portfolio size. This increased size, in turn, increases the likelihood of
ex post support, causing a further downward shift in the marginal cost
curve. This downward shift results in further portfolio growth, and so
on. The result is a vicious circle:
Figure 2.6: Incentives to Grow

This adverse-feedback loop means that discretionary support
creates incentives for money-claim issuers to grow. This regime of
discretionary support (verging toward unconditional support) was the
de facto policy of major industrialized nations, including the United
States, in the years preceding the recent crisis. Public subsidies and
dramatic financial-sector growth were a natural result.
The foregoing discussion has identified significant obstacles to
the efficient design of ex post support policies. The unconditional

Ricks_Ready for PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2012]

10/18/2012 9:47 AM

MONETARY STABILITY

1337

policy, the collateral policy, the solvency policy, and the discretionary
policy each appear to have significant drawbacks. Apart from
unconditional support, all of them leave open the possibility of runexternalities. Moreover, all of them are associated with public
subsidies. This is a necessary consequence of a standing public credit
commitment, even a purportedly “conditional” one, that is provided
free of charge.110
B. Moral Hazard Subsidy
The term “moral hazard” is frequently used in a loose sense to
characterize the subsidy described above. Strictly speaking, however,
the government subsidy analyzed above is distinct from the effects of
moral hazard. The subsidy discussed above might be termed a funding
subsidy: a reduction in the cost of money-claim funding due to the
potential for ex post support. Moral hazard refers to something else—
namely, the incentive of a party that does not bear the full downside of
its decisions to take greater risks. Moral hazard arises when portfolios
are dynamic.
Basic options theory elucidates this concept. The value of an
option is an increasing function of the volatility of the underlying
asset. A party that does not fully internalize the costs of its actions
(the put-owner) extracts value from the party bearing the downside
(the put-writer) by increasing risk (volatility). Funding subsidies, by
contrast, do not rely on this incentive effect.
The following figure depicts the effects of moral hazard arising
from a conditional ex post support regime:

110. Among the ironies of the lender of last resort is that the very firms that receive this
subsidy are engaged in the business of charging substantial fees for undrawn credit
commitments. None of these firms would write a credit commitment, even a conditional one,
without charging for it!
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Figure 2.7: Moral Hazard

Moral hazard results in a rightward shift in the marginal
revenue curve: the possibility of ex post support presents the firm with
additional investment opportunities in riskier assets. This Figure
depicts both funding subsidy (dark gray area) and moral hazard
subsidy (medium gray area). It is evident that moral hazard subsidy
flows directly to the firm: it represents a value transfer to the firm
from the government—an inefficient resource allocation.111
This figure shows that ex post support has the combined effect
of shifting the marginal cost curve downward and the marginal
revenue curve rightward. Interestingly, ex ante risk constraints were
previously shown to have exactly the opposite effect. Portfolio
restrictions shift the marginal revenue curve leftward, and capital
requirements shift the marginal cost curve upward. Such constraints
might therefore be expected to have utility in counteracting the
subsidies that are inherent in an ex post support regime. Notably,
using ex ante risk constraints in this narrow manner—solely to
counteract the effects of funding and moral hazard subsidies—does not
require speculative assessments of run-externalities. Instead,
calibration is based on a firm-specific analysis designed to return firm

111. Moral hazard also shifts the (subsidized) marginal cost curve back upward somewhat,
since riskier firms are more likely to default. The upward shift has the effect of mitigating the
funding subsidy. However, any such reduction must be more than offset by the new moral hazard
subsidy—otherwise the firm would not derive value from increasing risk.
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risk to its unaffected level. This topic will appear again when the PPP
regime is discussed in Part IV.
C. Capital Subsidy
Finally, there is one other subtle yet distinct form of subsidy
that maturity-transformation firms enjoy as a result of the availability
of ex post support facilities. Recall that a maturity-transformation
firm’s weighted average cost of financing is a function of two
components: (1) its cost of money-claim funding, and (2) its cost of
capital financing. As discussed above, the prospect of ex post liquidity
support reduces these firms’ money-claim funding costs. However, less
obviously, it also reduces their costs of capital financing. This effect is
referred to as capital subsidy in this Article.
Capital subsidy is an artifact of legal design. When moneyclaim issuers receive liquidity support from the government, they are
protected from default and insolvency proceedings. However, without
insolvency proceedings, there is no legal mechanism to impair or
extinguish these firms’ capital instruments, including subordinated
and other long-term debt. As a result, capital instruments—
particularly long-term debt—are prevented from serving a lossabsorbing function.112 Thus the legal linkage between payment default
and capital impairment generates an additional form of subsidy, one
that is conceptually distinct from both funding subsidy and moral
hazard subsidy. In the context of the diagrams sketched above, capital
subsidy exerts additional downward pressure on the marginal cost
curve.
Upon reflection, the legal linkage between payment default and
capital impairment is not logically necessary. One can imagine various
institutional mechanisms to permit capital impairment even while
money-claims are honored in accordance with their terms. In fact, the
FDIC’s resolution regime for depository banks does exactly that:
insured deposit instruments are honored seamlessly in resolution,
while other creditor and shareholder claims are impaired or
extinguished. One can even imagine institutional mechanisms to
decouple payment default and capital impairment on a going-concern
basis, without the need for administrative resolution.113

112. AIG is the paradigmatic example from the recent crisis.
113. Recent “contingent capital” proposals aim to do exactly this: they convert long-term
debt claims into residual equity claims on a going-concern basis under specified circumstances,
with no payment default.
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It should be clear, however, that the institutional decoupling of
payment default and capital impairment, in and of itself, only
addresses capital subsidy. So long as the government commits
resources to avoid money-claim defaults, funding subsidies remain:
money-claimants are indifferent as to whether the firm may enter
“resolution,” so long as their claims will be honored in full and on
time. Likewise, moral hazard subsidies remain intact, as firms can
still extract value from the prospect of ex post support by increasing
risk ex ante. Finally, even with resolution tools, the government still
faces the difficult problem of determining the circumstances under
which money-claims will be honored within resolution, if at all. Will
authorities follow the unconditional policy, the collateral policy, the
solvency policy, the discretionary policy—or some other policy? As
described above, each of these policies is associated with
inefficiencies.114
Part I concluded that using ex ante risk constraints in isolation
poses challenges for the optimal regulation of maturity
transformation. It is now evident that ex post support is also
problematic from an efficiency perspective—even if combined with ex
ante risk constraints and even if supplied in the context of resolution
proceedings.
D. The Elusive Logic of the Lender of Last Resort
It’s as if the major banks have tapped a hole in the social till and they are drinking from
it with a straw.
—Tyler Cowen (libertarian economist and blogger), 2011115

The foregoing discussion has sought to shed light on the
distinct forms of subsidy that are entailed by the lender of last resort.
These subsidies need to be disentangled before meaningful policy
analysis can take place. Unfortunately, discussions in policy circles of
the lender of last resort often gloss over these institutional defects.
Discussions of the lender of last resort often follow a
predictable pattern. Proponents typically begin with a defense of the
strict collateral policy.116 They argue that the central bank should
establish a policy of lending only against collateral that is practically
114. These concerns have direct relevance to the new Orderly Liquidation Authority, a
centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Act. This topic will be addressed in Part V.
115. Tyler Cowen, The Inequality That Matters, AM. INTEREST, Jan. 2011, at 36.
116. The collateral policy is sometimes referred to as the “Bagehot rule,” after Walter
Bagehot, the legendary nineteenth-century English banker, essayist, and theorist. Bagehot
articulated this policy in his masterwork. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION
OF THE MONEY MARKET (1873).
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free from credit risk—say, Treasury and agency securities—and
nothing else. This view implies that financial firms that lack sufficient
risk-free collateral to support a central bank loan big enough to meet
their obligations in a panic should simply be allowed to default. This
position raises a basic question: If the reason for having a lender of
last resort in the first place is to reduce run-externalities, to what
extent should this strict collateral policy be expected to achieve that
objective?
It often turns out that advocates of the strict collateral policy
believe that, if this policy were credibly established, firms that issue
money-claims would choose to fully back their money-claims with
eligible collateral. As shown above, this “if you build it they will come”
assumption is not easily defended, either theoretically or historically.
Relatedly, it sometimes becomes apparent that adherents to this view
just do not think run-externalities are very troubling. This position
implies a measure of skepticism that there is any market failure to be
addressed in the first place. In that case, one wonders why we should
have a lender of last resort at all. At any rate, an ex post support
policy that strictly limits itself to very narrow categories of collateral
is unlikely to have much of an impact in preventing run-externalities.
Frequently, the discussion then takes a subtle turn. It becomes
apparent that the commitment to the collateral policy is softer than it
first appeared. The proponent’s argument goes something like this: we
should try to prevent panics by imposing ex ante risk constraints, but
it is important to have a lender of last resort to rescue solvent
financial firms in case a panic does happen. Thus the collateral policy
morphs into the solvency policy—a fundamentally different position.
This shift raises its own set of problems. It frequently becomes evident
that the proponent does not believe that the solvency policy generates
subsidies for the industry. When it is pointed out to the proponent
that the policy reduces the probability of default and therefore
necessarily reduces firms’ funding costs, it becomes obvious that the
proponent is resting on the assumption that the money-claim market
in its laissez-faire state is too punitive—healthy financial firms
default when they “should” stay open. This view logically implies that,
to the extent that the solvency policy reduces funding costs, this
reduction is appropriate. The solvency policy allows issuers to realize
their true, fundamental funding costs, as opposed to the artificially
high ones that prevail in a state of laissez-faire.
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Even if this were accurate—and it is not an easy position to
solvency policy eviscerates market discipline by moneyclaimants. Under the solvency policy, the central bank, not the
market, makes the ultimate decisions about which money-claim
issuers should be permitted to fail. The institutional capacity required
of the central bank to make valuation and solvency judgments is often
glossed over in this context. Finally, there is the question of whether
the default of an insolvent issuer might still result in catastrophic runexternalities. There is no doubt that the solvency policy enhances
issuers’ incentives to stay solvent (by the central bank’s standards),
but it does not follow that insolvencies will not happen. Would it be
wise policy for the central bank to allow Bank of America, Citigroup,
or J.P. Morgan to default if central bankers deemed them balancesheet insolvent during a liquidity crisis? If the point of ex post support
is to mitigate run-externalities, what reason is there to be confident
that the solvency policy—which, by definition, does not take runexternalities into account—is the optimal approach?
At this point the discussion sometimes takes yet another turn.
It turns out that the commitment to a solvency policy is also rather
soft. The proponent suggests that of course the central bank must take
run-externalities into account when deciding whether to extend
liquidity support. The central bank, it is said, must make a contextspecific judgment. Thus the solvency policy morphs into the ad hoc,
discretionary policy. The problems with the discretionary policy must
then be rehearsed: large subsidies for the largest firms; incentives for
firms to grow larger in order to capture this subsidy; and the absence
of any reliable means of estimating run-externalities, which makes
satisfactory implementation of the discretionary policy extremely
problematic.
It is instructive to conclude this discussion of ex post support by
considering a potential variant that was not discussed above. First,
imagine that the central bank adopts the collateral policy. That is, the
central bank will lend only against prespecified categories of relatively
low-risk collateral and only at prespecified haircuts. Second, imagine
that money-claim issuers are required to abide by portfolio
restrictions, and that that these portfolio restrictions are made
identical with the collateral that the central bank will accept. In other
words, money-claim issuers are permitted to own only those assets
that have been deemed to be acceptable collateral. Third, and finally,
imagine that money-claim issuers are required to abide by risk-based
defend117—the

117. Is it not just as likely that money-claimants will fail to run on a balance sheet–
insolvent issuer as it is that they will run on a balance sheet–solvent one?
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capital requirements,118 and that the amount of capital that must be
held against each asset is identical with the central bank’s
prespecified collateral haircut for that asset.
Under these conditions, every money-claim issuer that was in
compliance with the applicable portfolio restrictions and capital
requirements would by definition meet all of the central bank’s
conditions for liquidity support in an amount up to the issuer’s
maximum permissible quantity of money-claim financing. In effect,
the money-claims issued by compliant firms would be guaranteed by
the central bank. Here the outlines of the PPP regime begin to take
shape. The Article now turns to a consideration of this alternative.
IV.

THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ALTERNATIVE

The creation of money is in many respects an example of a public good.
—Kenneth Arrow (winner of the 1972 Nobel Prize in economics), 1969119
The market will not work effectively with monetary anarchy. . . . Let us not waste this
set of crises by exclusive recourse to jerry-built efforts to patch up the failed monetary
anarchy we have witnessed.
—James M. Buchanan (winner of the 1986 Nobel Prize in economics), 2010120

Ex ante risk constraints and conditional ex post support, used
either alone or in combination, are defective tools when it comes to the
regulation of money-claim issuance. These techniques are arguably
superior to the laissez-faire approach, but they entail significant social
costs of their own. Specifically, they necessarily entail surplus
reduction, inefficient subsidies, and/or the persistence of
(unmeasurable) run-externalities. This Part turns to an evaluation of
the third alternative: the public-private partnership system.
A. Institutional Design
In important respects, the PPP proposal resembles the existing
regulatory regime for depository banks. The PPP proposal consists of
the following basic elements, as outlined in the introduction:

118. “Risk-based” capital requirements require issuers to hold relatively more capital
against relatively riskier assets. Capital standards in many developed countries, including the
United States, have been risk-based since the 1988 Basel Accord.
119. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice
of Market Versus Non-market Allocations, in ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC
EXPENDITURES: THE PPP SYSTEM 48 (Joint Econ. Comm. of Congress ed., 1969).
120. James M. Buchanan, The Constitutionalization of Money, 30 CATO J. 251, 251, 258
(2010).
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1. Establish licensing requirements for the issuance of moneyclaims, and forbid the issuance of money-claims by
unlicensed parties.
2. Require licensed entities to abide by ex ante risk
constraints, including portfolio restrictions and capital
requirements.
3. Establish an explicit government commitment to stand
behind the money-claims issued by licensed entities—
making them default-free.
4. Require licensed entities to pay ongoing, risk-based fees to
the government in exchange for this public commitment.
The PPP system can be understood as a modernization of
depository regulation along functional lines. Instead of licensing
entities to issue deposit instruments, the PPP regime would license
entities to issue money-claims (“deposits” being just one variety of
money-claim). Instead of providing deposit insurance, the regime
would establish money-claim insurance (though without coverage
caps). Any issuer of money-claims, whether or not its money-claims
were formally styled as “deposits,” would be required to submit to the
terms of this regime. Any firm that chose not to finance itself with
money-claims would reside outside the system.
The PPP regime self-evidently reduces run-externalities to
zero, as money-claim defaults are ruled out by definition. The
government commits upfront to honor all money-claims; these
instruments become sovereign obligations. In return for this explicit
commitment, the government charges ongoing fees. The fees are risk
based, meaning that the government charges higher fees to riskier
issuers, as with the current deposit insurance system.121
It is useful to begin the analysis by supposing that the
government can price this fee perfectly (an assumption that will be
relaxed momentarily). The effect is as follows:

121. The FDIC has employed risk-based deposit insurance fees since 1992, as required by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, 12 U.S.C. §§
1811–1835A (2006).
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Figure 3.1: Effect of Optimal Insurance Fee

Although money-claimants supply funds at the risk-free rate,
the optimal risk-based fee restores the marginal cost curve to its
actuarially fair position. From the firm’s perspective, the all-in cost of
financing is unsubsidized. The quantity of production remains at its
unsubsidized level.
A perfectly calibrated insurance fee thus achieves an optimal
result. It permits full realization of economic surplus (light gray area
in Figure 3.1) with no subsidies and no run-externalities. Actuarially
fair fees exactly offset the government’s losses over the long term.
Losses are therefore mutualized among industry participants, with no
costs to taxpayers. Notably, the introduction of risk-based fees
presents the theoretical possibility of a perfectly efficient outcome—a
feature not shared by ex ante risk constraints, ex post support, or their
combination.
Realistically, implementation of the fee would not be perfect.
Even with a mispriced fee, run-externalities would still be zero.
However, imperfect fee pricing would generate inefficiencies122:

122. Figure 3.2 shows the effects of an underpriced fee. An overpriced fee also generates
inefficiencies, as it reduces economic surplus from maturity transformation. For ease of
exposition, this scenario is not discussed.
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Figure 3.2: Subsidies from Underpriced Fee

The Figure illustrates the distortive effects of imperfect fee
pricing. There are two distinct problems. First, if the fee is
underpriced, issuers enjoy a funding subsidy (dark gray area). Second,
unless the monetary authority can update the fee continuously,
issuers enjoy a moral hazard subsidy (medium gray area). The moral
hazard subsidy arises from the fact that issuers’ portfolios are
dynamic: they can extract additional value from the government by
increasing portfolio risk after the fee is set for a given period.
These two problems furnish a rationale for ex ante risk
constraints under the PPP regime. Consider the first problem:
imperfect valuation. It is reasonable to expect that the magnitude of
the government’s pricing errors will be lower to the extent that the
fair value of the fee is closer to zero. To see why, suppose that the
government systematically underprices the fee. Suppose also that the
short-term risk-free rate is 2.0%. Observe that the fee has a lower
bound of zero; the government will not charge a negative fee. If the
actuarially fair cost of money-claim funding for a given firm is 4.0%,
then the maximum absolute underpricing error is 2.0% (i.e., 4.0% less
2.0%). By contrast, if the actuarially fair cost of money-claim funding
is 7.0%, then the maximum absolute underpricing error is 5.0% (i.e.,
7.0% less 2.0%). A fee with a lower fair value leaves less room for
underpricing.
Ex ante risk constraints—portfolio restrictions and capital
requirements—reduce the fair value of the fee, all else equal. This fact
is most easily expressed in terms of options theory. Under the PPP

Ricks_Ready for PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2012]

MONETARY STABILITY

10/18/2012 9:47 AM

1347

regime, the government writes a put option on the firm’s assets,
struck at the face amount of its outstanding money-claims.123 The fair
premium for such an option is an increasing function of the volatility
of the firm’s asset portfolio. The fair premium also increases as the
option comes closer to being in-the-money (i.e., as capital declines).
Conversely, lower portfolio volatility and higher capital equate to a
lower fair fee. Consequently, these two ex ante risk constraints should
reduce costly fee-pricing errors.
Now turn to the second problem: the incentive to increase risk
after the fee has been established for a given period. This incentive
will manifest itself in two ways. First, issuers will seek to expand into
riskier asset classes. Second, issuers will seek to increase the fraction
of their balance sheets that they fund with cheap money-claims (as
opposed to capital). In this context, the policy rationale for ex ante risk
constraints—portfolio restrictions and capital requirements—is
obvious.
On reflection, the utility of ex ante risk constraints as a
component of a government insurance regime should not be
surprising. Private insurance firms use these very techniques.
Specifically, they: (1) charge premiums tailored to the degree of risk
underwritten; (2) impose deductibles to align incentives and absorb
“first loss”; and (3) impose covenants to constrain risk taking. These
techniques are precise analogues to the PPP regime’s risk-based fees,
capital requirements, and portfolio constraints, respectively. In other
words, the PPP system embodies the standard private-sector
techniques for optimizing insurance contracts.
B. Implementation and Calibration
A central theme of Parts II and III was the problem of
implementation. Both ex ante risk constraints and ex post support
were shown to entail social costs (surplus reduction and subsidies,
respectively). These costs come with a corresponding benefit: the
reduction of run-externalities. However, the equilibrium selection
problem—the fact that money-claimants are involved in a coordination
game—makes estimating run-externalities very problematic. In the
absence of a reasonably reliable way to estimate these negative
externalities, regulators lack a legitimate basis for calibration.

123. This insight is due to Robert Merton’s pioneering work. Robert C. Merton, An Analytic
Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan Guarantees: An Application of Modern
Option Pricing Theory, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 3 (1977).
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The PPP regime presents implementation challenges as well.
The regime’s three distinct tools—portfolio restrictions, capital
requirements, and ongoing fees—each require calibration. How might
regulators (collectively, the “monetary authority”) go about calibrating
these three tools?
Portfolio Restrictions. The monetary authority first faces the
question of portfolio restrictions. Here, it faces a tradeoff. On the one
hand, the riskier the assets on issuers’ balance sheets, the greater the
expected resource-misallocation costs of the regime. This consideration
tends to favor the safest assets available, such as risk-free government
securities. On the other hand, if the value of maturity transformation
is to be realized, the set of permissible investments must be large
enough to allow the proceeds of money-claim issuance to be deployed
effectively. The optimal supply of money-claims124 might far exceed
the available supply of risk-free government obligations. This
consideration favors a wider category of permissible investments,
encompassing relatively riskier assets.
This analysis suggests that the PPP system’s portfolio
restrictions should be a function of both the desired supply of moneyclaims and the available categories of credit assets. The monetary
authority starts by making the safest assets eligible. It then admits
assets of increasing risk—that is, various types of consumer and
business credit (loans and securities)—until an adequate supply of
investment opportunities exists. Naturally, equity securities and other
deeply subordinated instruments would be excluded.125 In addition,
regulators would seek to limit issuers to the safer end of the credit
spectrum by establishing underwriting standards designed to
minimize exposures to distressed or speculative credits. They would
also impose diversification requirements to limit concentration risks.
These techniques are part of the standard toolkit of depository
regulation as it exists today.
The optimization of these portfolio restrictions poses nontrivial
calibration challenges. But these challenges are not unique to the PPP
system. Any plausible regime for the regulation of maturity
transformation includes at its core a set of portfolio restrictions. Once
the laissez-faire system is abandoned, the task of implementing
portfolio restrictions appears to be unavoidable. Notably, under the
PPP regime, the calibration of portfolio restrictions does not require

124. Determining the optimal supply of money-claims is a question for monetary policy. This
topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
125. Licensed issuers would also be prohibited from conducting commercial activities
directly, which is just another type of equity exposure.
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an inherently speculative assessment of run-externalities, which are
ruled out by definition.
Capital Requirements. Second, capital requirements must be
established. As seen above, capital requirements serve to reduce
resource-misallocation costs by reducing likely pricing errors and
counteracting the effects of moral hazard. However, there is a tradeoff
here as well. The rationale for establishing the PPP regime in the first
place—instead of just requiring money-claim issuers to hold 100%
cash—is to mobilize otherwise idle cash reserves for deployment into
the capital markets. Imposing capital requirements on money-claim
issuers draws investment capital into a system whose very purpose is
to generate investment capital for the real economy.126 Accordingly,
under the PPP regime, the monetary authority seeks to calibrate
capital requirements so as to maximize the difference between (1) the
benefit of capital requirements in terms of minimizing resource
misallocation, and (2) their cost in terms of reducing the net
investment capital generated by the maturity-transformation
industry. The analysis above suggests that capital requirements
should be risk-based, meaning that relatively more capital should be
required to be held against relatively riskier portfolios (as is the case
under modern depository regulation).
As with portfolio restrictions, optimizing capital requirements
under this regime poses significant challenges. But, again, capital
requirements are a feature of any plausible regime for the regulation
of maturity transformation. The need to design and calibrate capital
requirements, like the need to design and calibrate portfolio
restrictions, cannot be avoided once the laissez-faire approach is
abandoned. Importantly, under the PPP regime, the calibration of this
tool does not require an inherently speculative assessment of runexternalities.
Ongoing Insurance Fees. Finally, risk-based fees must be
calibrated. As described above, the monetary authority seeks to charge
each issuer a fair premium for a put option written on the issuer’s
asset portfolio, struck at the face value of the issuer’s outstanding
money-claims. The value of this option is a function of the issuer’s

126. For illustration, suppose that the monetary authority seeks to generate $10 trillion of
money-claims through the PPP system. (This figure is probably accurate to an order of
magnitude.) A capital requirement of 8.0% would equate to an aggregate private sector equity
investment in the PPP system of $870 billion [.08 * $10tn/(1 – .08)]. An increase in capital
requirements to 9.0% would require a private sector equity investment of $989 billion—an
increase of $119 billion. If this increased capital absorption were not offset by a corresponding
benefit, the increase in capital requirements would generate a net social cost. (For simplicity,
these calculations assume that all assets are risk-weighted at 100% under the capital regime.)
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portfolio volatility and its level of capital (i.e., the difference between
the value of the firm’s assets and the face value of its money-claim
liabilities). To estimate portfolio volatility, the monetary authority
might take into account such factors as: the historical financial
performance of the firm; the historical loss experience of the asset
categories on the firm’s balance sheet; secondary-market benchmarks
for those asset categories; the pricing of the firm’s capital instruments,
if actively traded; publicly available credit ratings; assessments by
brokerage research analysts; the quality of management; the
adequacy of risk-management practices; and so on. These are the
types of factors that depository banking regulators rely upon today in
both prudential regulation and in setting deposit insurance fees. Once
portfolio volatility has been estimated, the government can avail itself
of widely used pricing models to value the put option. Because issuers’
asset portfolios are dynamic, each firm’s fee would be reset on a
periodic basis.
Setting these fees presents a significant valuation challenge,
and errors are costly. As described above, incorporating portfolio
restrictions and capital requirements into the PPP regime should
serve to reduce mispricing errors. These risk constraints should also
reduce the degree to which issuers can extract value by increasing
portfolio risk between periodic fee recalibration. Nevertheless, pricing
will presumably be less than perfect.
C. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The following table provides a synoptic comparison of the three
approaches to the regulation of maturity transformation considered in
this Article, alongside the laissez-faire alternative:
LaissezFaire

Ex Ante Risk
Constraints
(in isolation)

Conditional
Ex Post
Support127
(w/ ex ante risk
constraints)

Public-Private
Partnership

No benefit

Partial

Partial

Complete

Economic Benefits
Reduces Expected
Run-Externalities

127. Conditional ex post support is shown in the “discretionary” variant, in which the
monetary authority takes expected run-externalities into account in deciding whether to provide
liquidity support in any given instance.
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Economic Costs
Reduces
Economic
Surplus

None

Yes

None (so long as
risk constraints
are not too high)

None (so long as
fees and risk
constraints are
not too high)

Funding Subsidy

None

None

Yes

None (so long as
fees and risk
constraints are
not too low)

Incentives to
Grow

None

None

Yes

None (so long as
fees and risk
constraints are
not too low)

Moral Hazard
Subsidy

None

None

None (so long as
risk constraints
are not too low)

None (so long as
fees and risk
constraints are
not too low)

Capital Subsidy

None

None

None (so long as
combined with
resolution
authority)

None (so long as
combined with
resolution
authority)

Requires
Calibration of
Portfolio
Constraints and
Capital
Requirements

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Requires
Estimates of
“Systemic”
Consequences
(RunExternalities)

No

Yes

Yes

No

Requires Fee
Pricing

No

No

No

Yes

Implementation
Challenges

It is useful to conclude with a comparative cost-benefit analysis
of these alternative approaches:
Benefits. The rationale for government intervention in maturity
transformation is to mitigate the run-externalities that are generated
by the prospect of money-claim defaults. As shown in the first row of
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the table, only the PPP system offers a complete solution to this
problem. By design, the other regulatory approaches leave open the
possibility of run-externalities. Considering this criterion in isolation,
the PPP regime is superior.
Costs. The PPP regime necessarily inhibits the operation of
market discipline by money-claimants. Runs and panics are, after all,
the very manifestations of market discipline by money-claimants.
What is the social cost of this aspect of the PPP regime?
It is useful to consider this question from the perspective of
pricing. Under the PPP regime, the monetary authority occupies the
senior-most position in the financing structure of money-claim issuers.
It seeks to charge an actuarially fair price for its commitment, in the
form of an ongoing risk-based fee. If the monetary authority’s pricing
of its senior claim were identical to the laissez-faire market price, the
two regimes would result in exactly the same resource allocation, and
the PPP regime would generate no costs. However, to the extent that
the monetary authority’s pricing of this senior claim is inferior to (less
fundamentally accurate than) the market’s, the PPP system generates
inefficiencies. The pertinent question is whether the PPP regime’s
relative mispricing of this senior claim generates costs that outweigh
the regime’s stability-enhancing benefits.
In this regard, it is important to return to one of the key
implications of Part I.C In a state of laissez-faire, money-claimants are
engaged in a coordination game that gives rise to an equilibrium
selection problem. As a result, outcomes depend upon focal points that
may or may not have fundamental significance. Because prices are
determined by expected outcomes, it follows that money-claim prices
in a state of laissez-faire may be affected by factors that lack
fundamental significance. Indeed, it was argued above that moneyclaimants have relatively muted incentives to perform fundamental
investment analysis. This discussion suggests that laissez-faire
resource allocation in this market may be less than ideal to begin
with.
Laissez-faire distortions are important, because the policy
question is one of relative accuracy. The architecture of the PPP
regime is designed to reduce the expected magnitude of fee-pricing
errors. Importantly, the PPP system does not abandon market forces
entirely. Issuers are controlled by private shareholders who own
residual claims. The terms of the partnership are such that
shareholders lose their entire investment before the government loses
any. Thus the PPP system seeks to harness the incentives of long-term
capital providers to allocate resources efficiently. In view of these
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design features, as well as laissez-faire distortions, the relative costs of
the PPP regime might not be as great as they would appear at first.
Finally, it merits emphasis that ex post support facilities, such
as the lender of last resort, inhibit market discipline as well.
Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for those who disapprove of the PPP
regime on “market discipline” grounds to nevertheless support ex post
support facilities. These positions are not easily reconciled. Under an
ex post support regime, the monetary authority substitutes its own
valuation for that of the market, at least under some circumstances.
The more expansive these circumstances, the less market discipline
can be said to have any operative significance. Conversely, the less
expansive these circumstances, the greater the degree of runexternalities that remain.
Implementation Challenges. Once the laissez-faire approach is
abandoned, the calibration of regulatory techniques is unavoidable.
The discussion above stressed the difficulty of estimating the runexternalities associated with any given level of ex ante risk
constraints, or with any given ex post support policy. Any regulatory
regime under which money-claim defaults remain possible will
encounter this basic problem. In policy discussions, this difficulty is
often dismissed as a mere technical detail of implementation, to be
worked out later. Yet there is little reason to be confident that
analytical techniques can be devised that will make this problem more
tractable. As Schelling noted, equilibrium selection “may depend on
imagination more than on logic.”128
One of the key virtues of the PPP regime is that portfolio
restrictions and capital requirements are rationalized within a unified
framework, with no need to rely on inherently speculative estimates of
run-externalities. This is not to suggest that calibration under the
PPP regime is a simple matter. However, all else equal, we should
prefer regulatory approaches that rely upon more manageable
judgments.
D. International Considerations
The discussion so far has neglected cross-border considerations.
The PPP system would be rendered ineffective if foreign-domiciled
entities were able to issue large quantities of dollar-denominated
money-claims outside the perimeter of the regime. This phenomenon,
of course, exists today. Foreign banks issue Eurodollar obligations—
typically to U.S.-based cash parkers—and invest the proceeds back
128. SCHELLING, supra note 76, at 57.
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into the U.S. credit markets. This is classic fractional-reserve banking.
It involves the issuance of monetary instruments denominated in
dollars. However, it takes place outside the reach of U.S. monetary
authorities. During the recent crisis, the panic in the Eurodollar
market prompted a massive policy response from the Federal Reserve,
peaking at a staggering $580 billion in U.S. dollar funding to foreign
institutions via liquidity swaps with foreign central banks.129
For the PPP regime to work, this form of avoidance would need
to be addressed. To this end, a new international accord would be
needed—perhaps a “Basel money-claim accord” to complement the
existing Basel capital accord. The terms of this accord would be fairly
straightforward. States would agree to prevent domestic entities from
issuing money-claims denominated in nondomestic currencies.
Essentially, the Eurocurrency markets130 would cease to exist in their
current form. To be clear, the accord would not prevent, say, a German
bank from owning a U.S.-domiciled issuer of dollar money-claims
(which would be subject to the U.S. PPP regime). The German bank
could therefore offer dollar money-claims to its own clients. In effect,
the international accord would acknowledge money creation as a
sovereign prerogative.
V.

CONCLUSION

A. Observations on the Existing Regulatory Structure
What approach to maturity transformation does our current
regulatory system take: laissez-faire, ex ante risk constraints, ex post
support, or public-private partnership? The answer is all of them—or
none of them. The functional activity of maturity transformation per
se has no regulatory status. Money-claims are not a cognizable
regulatory category; their issuance has no operative legal significance.
Issuers of deposit instruments are a special case. Insured
depository institutions operate under a regime that approaches a
public-private partnership.131 They are subject to portfolio constraints
and capital requirements; the government stands behind the insured

129. The original crisis-related liquidity swaps expired in February 2010, but they were
revived in May 2010 in response to renewed strains in the Eurodollar markets.
130. This term refers to deposit liabilities that are denominated in nondomestic currencies,
irrespective of where the issuer is domiciled.
131. Until quite recently, this resemblance was rather crude. Under the PPP system
sketched above, it is essential that both capital requirements and ongoing fees be risk based.
While deposit insurance has been with us for eighty years, these two critical tools have been riskbased for only the past twenty or so.
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deposits they issue; they pay ongoing fees in return for this support;
and nondepositories are legally prohibited from issuing deposit
instruments. As a historical matter, this approach appears to have
been stability enhancing. Since the inception of this system, no
insured depositor runs have taken place.
Issuers of money market mutual fund shares, too, fall under a
special regime. However, theirs is not a public-private partnership but
rather a risk-constraint regime. Money market mutual funds are
limited to a narrow range of permissible investments, and they must
abide by strict diversification requirements.132 While these institutions
did receive ex post support during the recent crisis, subsequent
legislation has called into question whether such support would be
available in the future.133
What about other types of money-claims—how are their issuers
regulated? It depends. Consider the market for short-term repurchase
agreements. Many repo issuers are owned directly or indirectly by
bank holding companies (because they are affiliated with depository
institutions), in which case their issuers fall under the Federal
Reserve’s regulatory and supervisory aegis.134 As a result, such issuers
are subject to consolidated capital requirements and certain
restrictions on affiliations. But not all repo-funded dealers are owned
by bank holding companies. For that matter, many hedge funds issue
repo as well, and they fall outside of any meaningful regulatory
regime. Looking beyond repo to other money-claims—such as financial
commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper, and Eurodollar
obligations—it is apparent that our regulatory system does not adopt
a consistent approach to maturity transformation.135

132. See Investment Company Act of 1940 Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2012) (detailing
permissible investments and diversification requirements).
133. The Treasury Department’s guarantee of the MMMF industry represented a staggering
$3 trillion national public commitment. Congress has since removed the legal basis for this
guarantee. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 131(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5236(b)
(2011) (“The Secretary is prohibited from using the Emergency Stabilization Fund for the
establishment of any future guaranty programs for the United States money market mutual
fund industry.”).
134. All bank holding companies have been subject to regulation and supervision on a
consolidated basis by the Federal Reserve since the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–52 (2006)).
135. It is possible that some money-claim issuers that are not otherwise subject to robust
regulation will be brought under the Federal Reserve’s regulatory umbrella pursuant to the new
“systemic designation” authority under Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act. (Indeed, “the degree
of reliance on short-term funding” is one of ten open-ended factors that the Financial Stability
Oversight Council is required to consider in making these determinations.) But the operative
word here is possible.
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Likewise, lender-of-last-resort support from the Federal
Reserve is generally available only for depository banks.136 While
nondepositories may receive such support under “unusual and exigent
circumstances,” the Dodd-Frank Act has imposed significant
limitations on this exception.137 Carving back on ex post support
should be expected to reduce subsidies. But there is little reason to
believe that, in the absence of ex post support, catastrophic panics will
not happen. Panics were the reason for the establishment of ex post
support in the first place.
It is often argued that the new Orderly Liquidation Authority
(“OLA”), one of the centerpieces of the Dodd-Frank Act, has provided
the critical tool to thread the needle—to allow financial firms to fail in
an “orderly” way, while impairing creditors, protecting taxpayers from
losses, and preventing damaging run-externalities. This topic was
covered at length in Regulating Money Creation.138 For present
purposes, it can simply be noted that OLA was not designed to prevent
money-claim defaults, nor does it provide a reliable means to do so.
Indeed, the FDIC has indicated that money-claimants under OLA will
experience default “in virtually all cases.”139 This new authority
therefore cannot be expected to avoid the equilibrium selection
problem or materially mitigate run-externalities. True, OLA was
modeled closely on the FDIC’s existing resolution regime for
depository banks, and depository failures have been rendered
relatively benign since the advent of that system. But it seems likely
that the key to orderly depository failures is not depository
“resolution” per se, but rather deposit insurance. OLA does not
replicate this cornerstone of depository regulation. By contrast, the
PPP proposal does.
In short, unless a money-claim issuer happens to be a
depository bank, it is not explicitly eligible for ex post support, and it
may or may not be subject to ex ante risk constraints. If the functional
activity of maturity transformation (money-claim issuance) is indeed
associated with a market failure, then our existing regulatory
structure, even as recently modified, does not embody a coherent

136. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (subsequently amended by §1101(a)
of the Dodd-Frank Act, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1101(a),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2011))).
137. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §1101(a), 12 U.S.C. §
343. These changes were reviewed in detail in Regulating Money Creation.
138. See Ricks, supra note 2, at 122–29.
139. Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4211 (Jan. 25, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380
(2012)).
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approach to this problem. Furthermore, if this market failure is the
central problem for financial regulatory policy—as this Article has
suggested—then recent reforms would appear to have been broadly
misdirected.
B. Some Implications
[W]hat we call necessary institutions are often no more than institutions to which we
have grown accustomed . . . .
—Alexis de Tocqueville, 1850140

Conceptually, the PPP approach is conservative. It represents a
logical evolution of a set of tools that has been used in the United
States for decades, with reasonable success. No new regulatory
capacities, techniques, or institutions would be required. As a matter
of regulatory organization, the regime could be administered by a
single monetary authority. Alternatively, it could be administered
through a fragmented system—like our existing system, under which
monetary
policy,
prudential
oversight,
and
deposit
insurance/resolution responsibilities are allocated to different
agencies. These are matters of detail.
In terms of the industrial organization of finance, however,
adopting the PPP approach would have far-reaching consequences.
Large portions of the financial industry that currently rely heavily
(directly or indirectly) on money-claim funding would be required to
term out their financing structures. The effects on the profitability
and size of these firms would be very substantial. Relatedly, the PPP
regime should be expected to result in higher bid-ask spreads in the
capital markets, reducing overall capital mobility to some degree.
Moreover, the money market mutual fund business model would be
rendered uneconomic.141 These effects are undesirable when
considered in isolation. However, the removal of a subsidy is
necessarily costly to its beneficiaries.
More important are the costs of imperfect implementation.
Like the available regulatory alternatives, the PPP regime requires
the monetary authority to make difficult appraisals of value. Any
deficiencies in its appraisals would generate social costs. However,
this is true of any government intervention to address a market
140. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE RECOLLECTIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 101
(Alexander Teixeira de Mattos trans., The Macmillan Co. 1896).
141. MMMF portfolios consist entirely of money-claims, which would all be federally insured
under the PPP regime, reducing their yield. In addition, MMMFs would be required to pay
ongoing fees and abide by capital requirements, since their “shares” are themselves moneyclaims. It is very unlikely that this business model would generate sufficient returns to be viable.
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failure—from national defense, to antitrust enforcement, to
environmental protection, to the provision of infrastructure, and so on.
The costs of publicly underwriting the money supply through the PPP
system must be weighed against the benefits of monetary stability,
which appear to be substantial.
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APPENDIX A: SOURCES FOR MONEY-CLAIM FIGURES
Measure
Currency in Circulation

Source
Federal Reserve Bank of St.

Notes
Year-end data.

Louis – Economic Research
Division (“FRED”)
Federal Reserve Balances

FRED

Year-end data.

Treasury Bills

2011 Economic Report of the

Year-end data.

President – Table B-87
Insured Deposits

Federal Deposit Insurance

Estimated Insured Deposits

Corporation (“FDIC”) – 2011Q1

reported by the FDIC; Q4 data.

Quarterly Banking Profile
Short-Term Agency

Bloomberg (Government

FHLB discount notes

Securities

Sponsored Enterprise (“GSE”)

extrapolated prior to 1998 (as a

short-term borrowing); 2010

constant proportion of GSE short

Annual Reports for Fannie Mae

term borrowings). Year-end data

and Freddie Mac; Federal Home except for Freddie Mac 2010,
Loan Bank (“FHLB”) Office of

whose short-term debt measure

Finance Annual Reports

is an average balance.

(discount notes)
Primary Dealer Repo

Treasury Department Financial Extrapolated prior to 1995 (as a
Stability Oversight Council

constant proportion of financial

(“FSOC”) 2011 Annual Report

commercial paper); Q4 data.

Chart 5.2.43; Federal Reserve
Asset-Backed CP

Federal Reserve Data Download Pre-2001 data reflects Federal
Program; FRED

Reserve’s old method; 1991
figure not available, so set equal
to 1992; December data. 20012010 data reflects Fed’s new
method; year-end data.

Financial CP

Federal Reserve Data Download Pre-2001 data reflects the Fed’s
Program; FRED

old method; December data.
2001-2010 data reflects the Fed’s
new method; year-end data.

Nonfinancial CP

Federal Reserve Data Download Pre-2001 data reflects the Fed’s
Program; FRED

old method; December data.
2001-2010 data reflects the Fed’s
new method; year-end data.
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Measure

Eurodollar Deposits

Source
FDIC 2011Q1 Quarterly

[Vol. 65:5:1289
Notes

Sum of (1) the FDIC’s reported

Banking Report; McGuire & von foreign office deposits and (2)
Peter, The US Dollar Shortage

McGuire and von Peter’s $2.2

in Global Banking, BIS

trillion Eurodollar deposit

Quarterly Review 54 (March

estimate for 2007 extrapolated

2009)

before and after 2007 (as a
constant proportion of the
FDIC’s reported foreign office
deposits). Q4 data.

Government Money Market Investment Company Institute
Mutual Funds

Year-end data.

2011 Investment Company
Factbook

Nongovernment Money

Investment Company Institute

Includes both the

Market Mutual Funds

2011 Investment Company

nongovernment and tax-exempt

Factbook

categories reported in the ICI
Factbook; year-end data.

Liquidity-Put Bonds

FSOC 2011 Annual Report

2005-2010 estimates are the sum

Chart 5.2.42; Federal Reserve

of the average amounts
outstanding of Tender Option
Bonds, Auction Rate Securities,
and Variable Rate Demand
Bonds; extrapolated prior to
2005 (as a constant proportion of
ABCP); year-end data.

Uninsured Deposits

FDIC 2011 Quarterly Banking

Calculated by subtracting

Report

Estimated Insured Deposits from
Domestic Office Deposits; Q4
data.

